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Terrorism is a complex issue without any clear or simple solutions. Much of the problem 
space around counterterrorism is amorphous, and most of the vast literature attempting to 
impose clarity on terrorism studies fails to do so. This thesis takes a different approach by 
exploring how ambiguity and uncertainty might be leveraged as a tool for Western liberal 
democracies in the fight against terrorism. 
 Strategies of Cold War nuclear deterrence are examined and specific instances of 
the advantages of uncertainty are identified. Ambiguity and uncertainty are defined and 
described in detail, and examples of how they might be used are discussed. This thesis 
concludes that greater terror threats warrant greater use of strategies employing 
uncertainty on the part of one’s enemies and oneself. 
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A. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Terrorism is a difficult problem for liberal governments with countless—often 
inconsistent—definitions of the term in use even within single governments. Are 
terrorists criminals, to be pursued by law enforcement agencies and tried in civil courts? 
Are they enemies of the state to be battled by military forces and handled entirely by 
martial justice systems? Is it merely success that moves them from one category to the 
other? Is ideology a factor in defining who is a terrorist, or is it purely the tactics 
employed? If the latter, how do we reconcile our support of “freedom fighters” in some 
places that use the same methods as enemies we are fighting elsewhere? Further 
complicating the issue, modern open societies demand near-perfect prevention efforts, 
but the governments of such societies will necessarily be constrained in their counter-
terrorism efforts by constitutional checks, transparency laws, and all manner of rules that 
keep their countries open and free. 
In the last decade, thousands of books and articles have been written on terrorism 
but few if any approach the subject from the direction of uncertainty. Many have 
considered methods of deterrence, examined individual and group causal factors, and 
created explanatory and—much less successfully—predictive models. But in nearly every 
case, the focus is on reducing uncertainty. Whether the goal is predicting the actions of 
our enemies, improving our intelligence capabilities to reduce chances of strategic 
surprise, or creating intelligible policies and statements on what our response to terrorism 
should be, nearly everyone seems to be seeking clarity. This paper, by contrast, 
endeavors to examine the gray areas between known and unknown, and to determine the 
circumstances under which a liberal Western-style democracy might benefit from 
leveraging existing uncertainties or even injecting unpredictability into counter-terrorism 
policies. 
Such an idea is not new, having been discussed extensively by Cold War 
strategists, but this type of approach fell out of favor as our increase in capabilities far 
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outpaced those of our enemies, and it was no longer necessary. Our strength of arms and 
strength of principles has led us to focus more exclusively on power and clarity over 
cleverness and ambiguity, but this thesis argues that a more nuanced approach may 
sometimes provide potent advantages. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Under what conditions might intentionally ambiguous counter-terrorism policies 
be advantageous for a powerful Western liberal democracy? 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. The Foundering State of Terrorism Studies 
For decades, social scientists have lamented the state terrorism studies.1 Andrew 
Silke described the situation so: 
It is possible for a research community to remain active indefinitely 
without ever producing meaningful explanatory results (while tolerating 
very high levels of conceptual confusion and disagreement). It seems 
relatively clear that terrorism research exists in such a state and that after 
over 30 years of enquiry, the field shows little evidence that it is capable 
of making the leap to consistently producing research of genuine 
explanatory and predictive value.2  
Similarly argued by Horgan: “The sheer volume” of works on terrorism cannot 
mask “its questionable nature.”3 Schmid and Jorgman estimate that 80 percent of the 
literature is “not research-based in any rigorous sense.” Such an assessment appears to be 
common if not mainstream. 
                                                 
1. Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, 
Data Bases, Theories and Literature (Oxford: North Holland 1988), 179; A. Silke (2001) “The Devil You 
Know: Continuing Problems with Research on Terrorism, Terrorism and Political Violence,” September, 
2010, 13:4, 1–14, DOI: 10.1080/09546550109609697; John Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism, Cass 
Series; Political Violence (London; New York: Routledge, 2005).; Marc Sageman ( March 2014) “The 
Stagnation in Terrorism Research,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 26:4, 565–580, DOI: 
10.1080/09546553.2014.895649 
2. Ibid. Silke, 2.  
3. Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism, 26. 
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The most obvious (though not the most damning) indicator of the lack of clarity in 
terrorism studies is the many pages that most works on terrorism dedicate to trying to 
establish an acceptable definition of “terrorism” and “terrorist.”4 Horgan argues that the 
same boundary problems often discussed when writing about terrorism are nearly 
universal, but other disciplines do not find themselves stymied by this problem.5 Scholars 
consistently offer the same reasons for the failure of terrorism studies to advance, but it 
seems that little progress is being made in addressing them.6  
2. Looking to Past Successes 
Many have argued that the United States is going through a revolution of security 
doctrine to address the rapidly evolving balance of power worldwide.7 The last time the 
U.S. had a major paradigm shift in security was in the adaptation to the new nuclear 
world early in the Cold War. Much work was done at the time by Thomas Schelling, 
Warner Schilling, Herman Kahn, Henry Kissinger, Martin Halperin, and others on 
studying the implications of different strategies. Generally rigorous and often based in the 
cutting-edge mathematics and social sciences of their time, the works of these individuals 
stand in stark contrast to most present attempts to develop comprehensive counter-
terrorism strategies. 
                                                 
4. Ibid., 25–27. 
5. Ibid., 26. 
6. Reasons given by Silke, Horgan, Sageman, Schmid and Jorgman include the emotionally charged 
nature of the topic; the inaccessibility of many individuals whose availability for study would advance the 
discipline, and the danger of finding/interviewing them; the overwhelming focus on government 
“firefighting” policies that are but a small piece of any effective counterterrorism response; a refusal by 
many to accept that terrorism is a rational behavior and that terrorists are usually rational agents who can be 
receptive to negotiation; an overreliance on technological solutions by many of those who accept the 
rationality of terrorists; the tendency of government intelligence agencies that have new and useful data to 
overclassify it and not share it; the inability of intelligence agencies that have this data to do rigorous 
academic work; the overreliance of academics on open source and re-worked old public data; and the 
simple fact that terrorism is a complex issue without any silver-bullet solutions. 
7. E.g., Philip Bobbitt, Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First Century, 1st Anchor Books 
ed (New York: Anchor Books, 2009). 
Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (Oxford University Press, 2013). 
General Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force (Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2007). 
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Cold War military theorists based their arguments in game theory and information 
theory, which have seen much advancement in the intervening years. Although many 
social scientists have attempted to apply their own discipline’s tools to the study of 
terrorism, little has come of their efforts and only a few have developed any detailed 
applications of game and information theories. Most of those attempts have been both too 
specific and not specific enough, with most authors applying rigorous methods to 
particular problems in counterterrorism (e.g., smallpox vaccination), but using such 
limited and/or estimated inputs that their outputs are not very informative.8 
This paper attempts to examine how one approach from Cold War strategy—
namely the study of uncertainty and asymmetric information around Cold War deterrence 
and war-fighting nuclear strategies—might be applied to terrorism studies. Because of the 
limited scope of this project and my lack of access to new information, this paper will 
likely suffer from many of the same shortcomings identified by Silke and Sageman in 
Note 7 above, but I will avoid all the pitfalls where possible, and try to point out the ones 
I cannot. 
3. The Study of Deterrence 
The first book on modern game theory, by John von Neumann and Oskar 
Morgenstern, was published in 1944.9 This coincided with the deployment of nuclear 
weapons, the massive growth of the academy as a public institution in the U.S., and the 
beginning of heavy involvement of social scientists in the development of security 
strategy. By the end of World War II, the nation’s military postgraduate institutions were 
growing rapidly;10 the RAND Corporation was established to do research to benefit “the 
                                                 
8. Alyson G. Wilson, Gregory D. Wilson, and David H. Olwell, eds., Statistical Methods in 
Counterterrorism: Game Theory, Modeling, Syndromic Surveillance, and Biometric Authentication (New 
York: Springer, 2006); Daniel G. Arce M. and Todd Sandler, “Counterterrorism: A Game-Theoretic 
Analysis,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 49, No. 2, The Political Economy of Transnational 
Terrorism (Apr., 2005), 183–200. 
9.  John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Princeton 
University Press, 1944). 
10. “NPS History,” Naval Postgraduate School, accessed February 8, 2015, 
http://www.nps.edu/About/NPSHistory/History.html. 
 5
public welfare and security;”11 and a system of national laboratories began to research the 
gamut of security and social issues.12 This confluence of factors seems to have fostered 
an ideal environment for this work; a massive body of academic work and stunning 
advances in social science applications to security theory occurred in just two decades. 
The U.S. had recently ended the most deadly and destructive conflict in human 
history, before or since, by unleashing the most powerful weapon the world had ever 
seen. It was clear soon after the war that our enemies were developing weapons of similar 
power, so addressing the issue of how to prevent nuclear war became a truly existential 
problem. Many brilliant men and women dedicated their careers to addressing this issue. 
Perhaps foremost among them was Thomas Schelling, whose Strategy of Conflict13 is “a 
masterpiece that should be recognized as one of the most important and influential books 
in social theory.”14 An economist by training, Schelling was the first to apply game 
theory systematically to all manner of security questions; for doing so, he won the Nobel 
Prize in Economics. He set the stage for later works on the subject by arguing that clashes 
of will are an inevitable part of the human condition and our efforts are better spent 
managing them rather than trying to prevent them. Schelling, followed by many others, 
used game theory to suggest a variety of conceptual tools for managing conflict.15  
“Strength through weakness” is a common theme. Other authors, including Herman 
 
 
                                                 
11. “A Brief History of RAND,” The RAND Corporation, accessed February 8, 2015, 
http://www.rand.org/about/history/a-brief-history-of-rand.html. 
12. “Office of Science History,” US Department of Energy, accessed February 8, 2015, 
http://science.energy.gov/about/history/. 
13. Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963).  
Eighteen years newer, Schelling’s Micromotives also provides interesting and useful arguments. In it 
Schelling describes how inferring individual objectives from aggregate group behavior can misleading, 
especially because individual behaviors are generally selfish but constantly contingent on others’ actions. 
Thomas C. Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior, (New York: Norton, 1978). 
14. Roger B. Myerson, "Learning from Schelling's Strategy of Conflict," 2009, Journal of Economic 
Literature, 47(4): 1109–25. 
15. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 3–4. 
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Kahn,16  Henry Kissinger,17 and Roger Hilsman,18 explore the same issue—managing 
conflict—through similar frames using both theoretical and practical examples. My 
arguments will frequently reference the works of these theorists.  
4. The “New Terrorism” 
The field of terrorism studies is not new. Since the 1960s, researchers from a 
variety of disciplines have been working to understand how people turn to terrorism and 
how they might they can be deterred. For this thesis to be viable it has been necessary to 
attempt a survey—if necessarily incomplete, due to the volume—of the existing literature 
on terrorism. What follows is a brief description of those readings judged particularly 
influential or especially relevant to the arguments of this thesis. 
In 1979, Paul Wilkinson outlined a method of framing terrorism studies that has 
been useful in classifying the terrorism research reviewed for this thesis.19 He described 
three approaches: “Traditional analytical” writings examine a group’s capabilities and 
objectives to determine the risk they pose. A “speculative” approach reverses the process, 
asking what targets and types of attacks would be attractive to a group with a given 
mission and philosophy, allowing for more assumptions to fill in unknowns. Finally, the 
“crisis management: nontechnical threat assessment” approach works in a more real-time 
fashion to gather intelligence on threats of the moment and provide recommendations to 
decision-makers. Each approach has its benefits, but Wilkinson warns against relying too 
heavily on any one. 
In their more rigorous incarnations, all three should be highly “analytical” 
approaches, carefully employing known data points to build up knowledge or arguments. 
                                                 
16. Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton University Press, 1960); Herman Kahn, and 
Thinking About the Unthinkable (Horizon Press, 1962). 
17. Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994). Argues that we tend to 
vacillate between idealism and realism (as necessary and as politically viable) and addresses many real life 
complexities relating to deterrence and credibility throughout modern U.S. history. 
18. Roger Hilsman, From Nuclear Military Strategy to a World without War: A History and a 
Proposal (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1999). 
19. Yonah Alexander, David Carlton and Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism: Theory and Practice (Boulder, 
Colo.: Westview Press, 1979). 
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This breakdown does, however, indicate that there is a spectrum from more analytical to 
more speculative in terrorism studies, and through the research for this project such a 
spectrum emerged, if only in the mind of the author.20 Purely analytic works appear 
nearly journalistic, examining in great detail the history, actions, and stated intentions of 
specific terrorists. Conversely, highly speculative work is sometimes little better than an 
accumulation of tabloid “what-ifs,” using only a few confirmed facts to guess at what 
attacks might be imminent and what responses might be effective.21 
Analytical research is necessary to lay the groundwork for useful theoretical 
models, but any modeling necessarily moves into the speculative realm. The product of 
such models can be more or less analytically grounded, depending on their sources. More 
analytic examples should inspire more confidence in their results, be they descriptive, 
predictive or prescriptive in intent. 
Inside Terrorism by Bruce Hoffman serves as an example of almost pure 
analytical writing. It offers an incredibly detailed history of the term terrorism and the 
practice of it in both historical and contemporary contexts. A small number of other 
works appear to fall into a similar category.22 This type of research is foundational; 
whatever its source, it is necessary for any descriptive, predictive or prescriptive models 
of any value. Similarly, such readings are important in evaluating new perspectives or 
strategies. 
                                                 
20. According to the Oxford Dictionaries online, “analyze” means to “Examine methodically and in 
detail the constitution or structure of (something, especially information), typically for purposes of 
explanation and interpretation.” To “speculate,” on the other hand, is to “Form a theory or conjecture about 
a subject without firm evidence.”  
21. I should note that these are not at all exclusive categories. One author may shift from one extreme 
to the other within the same work and indeed within the same paragraph. One can, however, roughly weigh 
works in their entirety, which I have attempted to do. 
22. On the subject of suicide terrorism, Pedahzur’s work of the same name fits in this category. Some 
writings by Brian Jenkins and Jonathan White would as well. I would probably classify Islamism by 
Strindberg and Warn as traditional analytic as well, although it does move into the next category 
occasionally. This type of work certainly makes up a minority of the literature, perhaps because it requires 
a large amount of difficult research, builds upon past work rather than creating something entirely new, and 
is therefore simply less flashy.  Ami Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism (Cambridge; Malden, MA: Polity, 2005); 
Anders Strindberg and Mats Wärn, Islamism: Religion, Radicalization, and Resistance (Cambridge, UK; 
Malden, MA: Polity, 2011); Council on Global Terrorism, State of the Struggle: Report on the Battle 
against Global Terrorism, ed. Lee Hamilton and Justine A. Rosenthal (Washington, D.C: Council on 
Global Terrorism : Brooking Institution Press [distributor], 2006); Jonathan Randall White, Terrorism and 
Homeland Security, 6th ed (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2009). 
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As Wilkinson described decades ago, however, such a perfectly analytic work 
does not necessarily take the final step into understanding. It is at the edges of traditional 
analytic, moving into speculative analytic, where sense-making takes place. Better sense-
making frameworks are rooted heavily in the more rigorously analytic research described 
above, and they provide theories that both describe historical happenings and help in 
understanding continuing events in the present. Often these have a dual footing in another 
discipline alongside terrorism studies, often sociology or psychology. Good examples 
include social identity explanations,23 psychological and psycho/social cause 
examinations,24 and psychological/philosophical understandings of the limited rational 
capacities of individual actors.25 
Because of their explanatory power, this class of writings is fascinating to read. 
There is great variety, and notable inconsistency, but a core set of beliefs appears to be 
held by a vast majority of researchers. Specifically, terrorists are generally 
psychologically healthy rational actors hoping to achieve specific goals, though their 
perspective on their actions may be vastly different than ours because of the social 
context within which they operate. An understanding of their culture and social 
influences is necessary to understand their motivations. All individuals are also unique, 
with different mixes of motivations—both selfish and group-oriented—and with distinct 
sets of available information and differing abilities to process that information. Most 
people are also likely to share some similar cognitive biases, independent of culture.26 
                                                 
23. Strindberg and Wärn, Islamism: Religion, Radicalization, and Resistance; R. Brad Deardorff, The 
Roots of Our Children’s War: Identity and the War on Terrorism, 2013; Seth J. Schwartz, Curtis S. Dunkel, 
and Alan S. Waterman, “Terrorism: An Identity Theory Perspective,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 32, 
no. 6 (May 2009): 537–59, doi:10.1080/10576100902888453. 
24. Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan, eds., Leaving Terrorism behind: Individual and Collective 
Disengagement, Political Violence Series (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge, 2009); 
Tore Bjørgo, ed., Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality, and Ways Forward (London; New York: 
Routledge, 2005); Fathali M. Moghaddam, From the Terrorists’ Point of View: What They Experience and 
Why They Come to Destroy (Westport, Conn: Praeger Security International, 2006); John Horgan, The 
Psychology of Terrorism, Cass Series; Political Violence (London; New York: Routledge, 2005). 
25. Bryan D. Jones, “Bounded Rationality,” Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999). 
26. Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, 2nd ed., Random 
trade pbk. ed (New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2010); Sam L Savage, The Flaw of Averages 
Why We Underestimate Risk in the Face of Uncertainty (Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley, 2009), 
http://www.books24x7.com/marc.asp?bookid=31877;  Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind: Why Good 
People Are Divided by Politics and Religion (New York: Vintage Books, 2013). 
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Yet another step down the speculative path are predictive and prescriptive works, 
which build off the descriptive models and make specific recommendations. By adding 
predictive tools, researchers implicitly state that they have a good understanding of the 
topic; recommending specific courses of actions goes even further by saying one has at 
least some idea how actions and reactions might play out in the complexity of the real 
world.27 
All of these more speculative approaches are important for this thesis in that any 
judgment of the ideas I will be presenting must be handled within the context of existing 
sense-making frameworks. If the ideas presented here are irrelevant or inapplicable to 
various explanatory theories of terrorism, they are probably not worth exploring. 
There are a few works that should be addressed more specifically because they 
will play an important role in this research. First is the limits within which 
counterterrorism actions should be taken, outlined well by Paul Wilkinson in his 1986 
Terrorism and the Liberal State and its 2011 “sequel” Terrorism and Democracy. 
Wilkinson states in the latter work that democracies are “extraordinarily resilient” in the 
face of terrorism.28 He seems more open to a militaristic response in recent years, though 
he still says the military should be involved “with reluctance.” Several themes remain 
quite consistent over the years. They include a recommendation that all responses be 
entirely within the law and without violation of national principles; a warning against 
overreaction to specific incidents or groups; a need for international bodies and 
agreements to address the threat; full accountability of counterterrorist agents to civil 
authorities; and the idea that physical security measures alone will never be enough to 
prevent terrorism. These recommendations appear consistent with those advocated by 
most other counterterrorism researchers and are quite relevant to this thesis.  
As for what actions to take, a holistic response to preventing terrorism is 
advocated by Martha Crenshaw. She argued as early as 1983 for a multi-faceted approach 
                                                 
27. Boaz Ganor, an experienced consultant to the Israeli government on counterterrorism, prescribes a 
number of approaches in his “Guide for Decision Makers.” Boaz Ganor, The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A 
Guide for Decision Makers (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2007). 
28. Although in 1986, he was not as optimistic. 
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to terrorism that includes development, governmental reform, police and military 
response, media and information components, etc. It appears to be one of the earliest 
arguments for a more modern, holistic, long-term approach to terrorism that is now 
considered common-sense.29 
Though written before the 9/11 attacks, a collection of papers by RAND and the 
University of St. Andrews edited by Ian Lesser offers some interesting and well-framed 
distinctions. Lesser describes four types of threats terrorists pose to their more 
“powerful” opponents: direct, indirect, systemic, and war paradigmatic.30 Such a 
classification, while non-discrete and somewhat artificial, may be useful in considering 
different strategies. He also offers a more explicit depiction of the “conflict spectrum” 
and the increasing space within it that terrorism occupies. 
In a related essay, Paul Davis and Brian Jenkins discuss numerous concepts 
addressed later in this thesis, including co-option and inducement versus deterrence, 
summarized as the “ladder of coerciveness”; a comparison of Cold War strategy to 
counterterrorism; internalist versus externalist terrorists (roughly equivalent to the 
mercenaries and true believers described in more detail by Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan 
in their works on the psychology of terrorism); decomposition of terrorism motivations 
and processes, a technique used with success by RAND researchers on drug trafficking 
and other related issues; and a recognition of the credibility problem of deterrence.31 
Between them Bjørgo and Horgan have written and edited numerous volumes that 
are among the best speculative-analytical writings on the subject. Both argue strongly 
against a “syndrome” view of terrorism in favor of a rational-actor approach, 
incorporating the social frameworks from which each individual emerges. “Sterile” 
personality profile descriptions of terrorists are dismissed in favor of a process-oriented 
approach to analysis, examining experiences and behaviors that are more likely result in 
                                                 
29. Martha Crenshaw and Irving Louis Horowitz, eds., Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power: The 
Consequences of Political Violence: Essays, 1st ed (Middletown, Conn. : Scranton, Pa: Wesleyan 
University Press ; Distributed by Harper & Row, 1983). 
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radicalization and successful terrorist operations. Horgan also discusses the process of 
disengagement from terrorism, using the same methodology.32 
A 2005 conference in Norway on the causes of terrorism resulted in a series of 
essays and two books on this aspect of terrorism.33 Echoing Wilkinson, Bjørgo sets the 
stage by describing terrorism causes as “preconditions” or “precipitants.” One might 
conceive of this idea as a salience spectrum of causes, with preconditions and precipitant 
events marking the endpoints of the spectrum. Toward the precondition end are structural 
causes like globalization, modernization, or demographics; and facilitator causes like the 
evolution of weapons or weak state security. The middle ground includes motivational 
causes, which often include preconditions spun up by leadership or government policies 
with which the group disagrees. At the far precipitant end of the spectrum are triggering 
causes, such as Ariel Sharon’s visit to Haram al-Sharif that kicked off the second intifada, 
or the murder of Israeli settlers that spurred violence in Israel in 2014. Other essays in 
this collection reference and provide excellent summaries of the research on the 
relationship between poverty and terrorism (very weak); psychological characteristics of 
terrorists (rational and complex, with a calculus based in group as often as individual 
perceived goods or slights), vicious cycles that continue terrorist activities; whether it is 
better to addresses sustaining factors or root causes; and general recommendations on 
addressing identified causes. Finally, one essay described three motivational profiles for 
terrorists, that can be identified from observation of actions, but that are often intertwined 
in a group and even in a single individual. Mercenary, True Believer, and Captive Interest 
are rough profile types that seem to be supported by most other research, though often 
that research uses different terminology. 
A number of other works provide examples of other approaches to terrorism 
studies. Michael Kenney attempts to apply the business analysis tools of organizational 
                                                 
32. John Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism. 
33. Tore Bjørgo, ed., Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality, and Ways Forward (London; New 
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learning and competitive adaptation to terrorist and counter-terrorist networks.34 He 
discusses knowledge dissemination from a techne/metis perspective that I plan to relate to 
an explicit/implicit and individual/group knowledge framework that I will be using 
elsewhere in the paper. Describing decision and accountability flow through sample 
terrorist organizations as “hierarchical yet diffuse,” Kenney, in my opinion, provides a 
perspective on how Cold War uncertainty strategies might need to be modified to work 
for terrorist groups. His analysis of information flows, authority structures and decision 
cycles may also prove useful, though I am likely to temper such possibilities with 
references to epistemological analysis that indicates the limitations of explicit 
information transmission in social organizations.35  
I will also consider a variety of articles on game theory and statistics in counter-
terrorism. Unfortunately the methodology and application of the examples I’ve found 
result in very little of value beyond general theory. The only idea of real value I’ve taken 
from them so far is Gelernter’s “Law of Loopholes,” which describes how competitive 
players in a complex systems will always find loopholes around safeguards.36 This is 
particularly relevant to terrorists, for whom myriad viable targets magnifies the effect. 
While far from new, a more game-theoretic formulation of the concept will be useful. 
5. Advances in Game Theory, Social Science Tools 
In the years since the height of Cold War planning, much research has been done 
on various aspects of information theory. Classical game theory as outlined by Neumann 
and Morgenstern was relatively static. It assumed that each player would make decisions 
based on what would yield them the best outcome given the rules of the game, but failed 
to account for players making decisions based on their expectations of their opponent’s 
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moves. Numerous researchers have attempted to remedy this issue in the intervening 
years. Steven Brams introduced a more dynamic approach that maintains mathematical 
rigor while allowing for the complexity of taking into consideration future reactions to 
one’s own decision.37 Others have disputed this method, but it is still useful for this 
research.38 
Bayesian analysis illustrates a different vein of game-theory development. This is 
a mathematical formulation of the intuitive practice of weighting evidence depending on 
its source and measuring new data against the sum of existing evidence, and has become 
common practice in modern science. Glen Schafer outlined in his classic work A 
Mathematical Theory of Evidence (cited in more than 13,000 articles, according to 
Google Scholar) a more generalized application of Bayesian-type probability assessment, 
which does not require specific veristic probabilities to arrive at a confidence rating.39 
His “Dempster-Schafer Theory of Evidence” sometimes provides different results than 
classical probability assessments, and is likely more accurate in uncertain situations. 
Such mathematic tools have more recently been put to use in the field of logic. 
Classical logic is limited by its exclusively bivalent truth functions, meaning it is only 
fully useful when you have a good understanding of both the issue you are addressing 
and the specific truth-values of its various components. In the 1960s, the emergence of 
modal logic added “likely/unlikely” and “possible/not possible” as available descriptors 
when describing uncertain situations, and a few years later fuzzy logic opened further 
possibilities by creating sets with fuzzy barriers. In the last decade, Louis Zadeh extended 
the tools of fuzzy logic into the realm of statistical probability analysis to outline ways in 
which we can better deal with uncertain situations and create more accurate models, as 
well as how to more accurately deal with the linguistic “granulations,” i.e., fuzzy sets 
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such as the everyday descriptors “young,” “tall,” “most,” “usually,” etc.40 By classifying 
data into these fuzzy sets and then “defuzzifying” the resulting data, information 
scientists are finding they are able to more accurately model complex realities. 
Finally, much work has been done on the limits of people’s ability to act 
rationally. Though individuals generally try to make “rational” decisions (i.e., choices 
that have been calculated to provide the most benefit or best chance of reaching specific 
objectives) they are often unable to do so because of imperfect information, social 
pressures, cognitive biases, lack of intellectual ability, or other reasons.41 The heureristics 
that we rely on to process the vast quantities of information we take in sometimes fail us 
all, but even worse is that we often fail to recognize that such weaknesses might occur in 
our own mental processes.42 
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II. COLD WAR PROBLEMS AND APPROACHES 
A review of the literature has illustrated the frequent lack of rigor in terrorism 
studies and contrasted this with the more painstaking approach of many Cold War 
scholars. To determine whether any of the lessons from previous generations’ 
information-theory approaches to nuclear deterrence may hold relevance to the study of 
terrorism, one must first review the situation faced by theorists working in the 1950s and 
1960s and consider the approaches they used. 
A. OLD WAR PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 
Shortly after the end of the World War II, the United States faced a complicated 
new strategic problem. We possessed weapons capable of destroying enemies at will, 
quickly and efficiently. Unfortunately, our enemies had this same capability, and either 
side was probably able to launch a surprise attack that could destroy its enemy. However, 
if such an attack were to fail, the response would doubtless be so devastating as to be 
existentially threatening. This meant that a military conflict of any kind—or any heated 
political conflict, for that matter—had the potential to suddenly escalate to mutual 
annihilation. As summarized in the first book published on U.S. nuclear policy, in 1946: 
“Thus, far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From 
now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful 
purpose.”43 So began the Cold War. 
For the next several decades, the only rational security goal was to prevent war. 
The question at the forefront of security policy research then became: What doctrine and 
strategies can we employ to effectively prevent war? More accurately capturing the 
complexity of the problem, the question was: How can we avert war today while 
continually building our sphere of influence to ensure our continued economic and 
military dominance in the future? Emerging game theory and (later) systems theory were 
among the most widely employed tools by early strategists to address this problem. 
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The first to robustly outline game theory’s application to security was Thomas 
Schelling, whose 1960 book Strategy of Conflict was hugely influential at the time and 
remains relevant enough today to be commonly assigned in security and economics 
courses. His arguments began with the idea that conflict is not a pathological state that 
can be avoided, but is rather a natural and inevitable part of human interaction.44 
Assuming this is true, resources should be spent more on managing conflict than trying to 
prevent or avoid it. Schelling’s second foundational premise is that all virtually conflicts 
in the real world are non-zero-sum games. That is, real-world conflict is almost never 
pure conflict, with no overlap of interests. As such one side’s victory (or loss) does not 
necessarily have bearing on the wins or losses of the other side. One relevant example is 
that no matter who “wins” in a nuclear war, both sides end up much worse off than had 
the war never taken place. Schelling argues that there is almost always a set of 
overlapping interests, and that international conflict is actually a type of bargaining.45 His 
conclusion, similar to Brodie before him and many others after, is that the best military 
strategy in the nuclear age is one that specializes in “skillful non-use of military force.” 
Unfortunately it is far easier to state an intention to avert war than it is to craft 
policies that actually do so. It may be the case that “military strategy can no longer be 
thought of … as the science of military victory” but “the art of coercion, of intimidation 
and deterrence.46 But a realist perspective of conflict reveals many situations in which 
coercion and intimidation seem inadequate to the task. Political scientist Warner Schilling 
proposed the following thought experiment: Imagine you are locked in a “fortress-like 
squash court” with someone whom you believe to be evil. The room is divided in two 
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with high concrete wall, with one of you on each side with ten “totally good” babies. 
Each of you also has a hand grenade. If either throws their grenade, the other is likely to 
have just enough strength left to throw their own and ensure the deaths of all.47 
This is a good metaphor for Cold War nuclear deterrence. An evil person—or for 
that matter, any rational person facing a “good” enemy—has every motivation to act first. 
This is because any reactive response from a “good” person to a first strike could only be 
motivated by revenge, as the conflict has already been lost, and could only be 
accomplished at the cost of many innocent lives. Any rational person, knowing that their 
good opponent is unlikely to kill many innocents out of revenge, knows they have the 
upper hand—as their opponent is restrained by their moral framework from reacting to an 
attack—and therefore has a motivation to attack.48 And because both sides in war tend to 
view themselves as good and their enemy as evil, both assume that the enemy is at the 
gates with little reason to refrain from attack. Such natural tendencies are destabilizing, 
meaning that active stabilization strategies are a necessity to maintain peace.49 
The question becomes: What methods of preventing unwanted actions by our 
enemies do we have at our disposal? Obviously this is highly situational, but for most of 
the Cold War, the key was a strategy of aggressive deterrence. Described by Schelling as 
“influencing the choices another party will make by influencing his expectations of how 
we will behave,” deterrence is at its root a game of expectations. For such a game to 
work, a few necessary qualities must be present. First, one must have methods of 
communicating one’s intended response to different actions. These communications 
might be explicit or implied, public or back-channel, linguistic or symbolic (as through 
movement of resources). One’s enemy must be able and willing to understand such 
signals, which requires they be at least moderately rational and reasonably intelligent. 
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Deterrence also requires at least some understanding of what an enemy values, and 
methods of affecting the valued resources, people, or locations. 
In most international (i.e., between nation-states) conflict situations, these 
elements are all obviously in place. When considering an enemy nation, one can easily 
list a variety of resources they value: their cities, factors of production, methods of trade, 
military assets, leaders, and the population at large. As a superpower, we can quite easily 
destroy or devalue many of those items, and decision-makers of national governments 
can almost always be assumed to be rational or they would not last long as leaders.50 
We then find ourselves at the primary difficulty in any strategy of deterrence: 
How do we communicate threats that are believable, i.e., credible? If a threat would cost 
us little to implement and is fully in line with others’ past experiences with us, simply 
stating it might be enough.51 However, as threats become more costly to implement—
most costly being war that is likely to be horribly destructive to our own interests as well 
as to those of our enemies—it becomes more difficult to deter unwanted action simply by 
stating our intentions. This is when more commitment is required. “Binding oneself, in 
honor or reality”52 is a good way of doing so. Binding through honor might include 
treaties with foreign nations, public statements of intent that would be difficult to back 
out of, or staking one’s national pride through a binding of the issue to national dignity. 
Obviously a commitment bound only by honor is less credible than more rigid 
commitments. Thus, the most credible threats of all would force one to action regardless 
of whether doing so is the preferred response. In previous eras this could be 
accomplished by marrying the children of one’s royal family into the ruling families of 
allies, thus binding oneself to protecting that kingdom’s stability in order to protect one’s 
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offspring. Today an example might be allocating irrevocable response authority to a 
general known to be an aggressive hawk. Among the most rigid would be a doomsday 
machine like that in Dr. Strangelove (whose character was based on the theorists cited 
here), which automatically launches a full-scale nuclear war if a single enemy launch is 
detected. 
There are a number of other actions that can be taken to increase effectiveness of 
deterrent threats. Developing lesser response options might be assumed reasonable in that 
they offer more moderated options short of all-out war. However, they also decrease the 
credibility of any more severe threats, so limiting intermediate response options should 
increase credibility and better prevent the beginning of smaller wars that are likely to 
escalate.53 Offering enemies a face-saving “out” as part of the threat design will also 
increase the likelihood that they will respond in the desired way, as they are not stuck in a 
lose-lose situation. Therefore, threats should always include such an out, implicit or 
explicit, to realize full effectiveness. 
A review of the history of nuclear deterrence by the United States provides 
numerous examples of these techniques put into practice. Roger Hilsman, who served as 
an adviser to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and worked on exactly these issues, in 
practice and under pressure, offers some interesting case studies. The first nuclear-strike 
plan against the Soviet Union, SIOP-62 (Strategic Integration Operations Plan, 1962) 
identified 1,060 DGZs (Designated Ground Zeros) that would be attacked by 1,675 
nuclear warheads. Nearly 4,000 critical “targets” would be destroyed, many of which 
included important population centers in Soviet-allied nations such as China that had no 
missiles. This plan was rapidly discarded, as leaders perceived such a high level of 
unnecessary casualties as un-American. Kennedy was said to have remarked after being 
briefed on the plan, “And we call ourselves the human race!”54 Part of this resistance was 
pure moral revulsion, but it also reflected his understanding that as the “good guys” such 
threats by the United States were simply not acceptable, and thus not credible. To address 
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this, the following nuclear strategy approach, developed by Robert McNamara, worked to 
name only military and intelligence locations as targets. Even though “the Soviets, and 
many in the West, said a counterforce and first-strike strategy were identical”55 because 
many of those military and strategic targets were in or near the same cities that were 
previously targets themselves, such an approach assuaged American consciences and 
offered to the world a more credible—and therefore more effective—maximum-force 
threat. Indeed, variations of this same approach underpinned Nixon’s Schlessinger 
Doctrine56 and Carter’s Countervailing Strategy of 1980.57 
Another lesson can be found in Hilsman’s description of the Europeans’ strident 
resistance to tactical nuclear weapons, and to any “no first strike” strategy. Smaller 
nuclear warheads would do less to deter incursions into Europe and possibly move the 
worst of the battlefield to their own homelands, so resistance to them made sense within 
that frame. Instead they preferred massive strikes at Soviet population centers in response 
to any incursions into Western Europe and resisted any U.S. or NATO weapons 
deployments that might offer the option of smaller strikes. “The Europeans’ greatest fear 
was what came to be know as ‘decoupling,’”58 which included any separation of 
conventional and nuclear strategies. Such a separation could lead to Soviet invasions of 
Europe using only conventional weapons, being resisted by U.S. conventional forces, 
again moving the battlefield to a European theater. Even worse, an invasion might be 
ignored by America in order to prevent Soviet nuclear bombardment of the U.S. 
homeland. European strategy therefore strived to remove all intermediate options by 
decreeing that any Soviet aggressions should result in a full nuclear strike by NATO.59 
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In a similar vein, Schelling candidly recounted a less widely understood reason 
for U.S. troops being stationed in Germany, a move he was assigned to negotiate in 1953 
during his work on the Marshall Plan  
When Secretary of State Acheson went up to the Senate to be interrogated 
on what good seven American divisions would be in Europe, when even 
with seven divisions, the Soviets could overrun Western Europe, his 
answer was very simple. He said that what those seven divisions can do is 
not defend Western Europe, but can guarantee that if they are destroyed or 
captured the American people will not let the war stop there. These are 
hostages of fortune, to die or be captured … that was part of making the 
threat, that was the commitment.60  
Stationing forces in Europe was, according to Schelling, less about building 
relationships or providing defense than binding our cause to that of NATO’s, putting our 
skin in the game—literally, in this case—to heighten the credibility of our threats to 
strike back powerfully at Soviet attacks on Europe. 
B. THE WEAKNESS OF SPECIFICITY 
Readers familiar with the narrative of nuclear deterrence through the Cold War—
or even those with little knowledge of Cold War strategy who reflect on the implications 
of the strategies outlined above—are likely to see two major issues with using them as 
foundational components of national security policy. 
First, deterrence works by communicating to the enemy what they can expect us 
to do if they take certain actions. To be effective, threats have to be specific to a certain 
degree. If the enemy crosses a certain line (e.g., build up troop levels in a region to a 
certain level) then we will respond in a specific way. Too much specificity, however, 
simply encourages the enemy to build up exactly to the edge of what is allowable before 
we respond, then push against our limits of tolerance. This stressing the boundaries of 
acceptability almost inevitably leads to brinksmanship, and tells the enemy exactly how 
far they can go with no repercussions. In addition, providing too much detail on how we 
will respond to specific offenses erodes our ability to respond to smaller incursions 
without decreasing the credibility of future deterrent threats. 
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Second, the process of limiting lesser actions means we may be left with only 
options that are simply too overwhelming to be credible. The costs to us of actually 
implementing more major threats might be so great that the enemy will doubt that we 
have sufficient determination to fulfill the threat.61 
Combined, the acceptable boundary problem and the scale credibility problem lie 
at the heart of many of the security dilemmas of the modern age, both nuclear and non: 
 The Korean War began with a miscalculation by the USSR. Having just 
supported a Communist takeover of China, Soviet leaders assumed that 
the U.S.’s principle of containment had an eastern border of the Sea of 
Japan, and that the Americans wouldn’t risk war simply to protect South 
Korea. President Truman took a firmer stand than the Soviets had 
predicted, resulting in three years of war.62 
 Since 1979, the U.S. has promised to protect Taiwan against any threat 
from mainland China.63 Thirty years ago, when China was a much smaller 
presence on the national stage and a mostly closed Communist economic 
system, a bright line of total defense of Taiwan risked little and was 
consistent with our Cold War interests. In the intervening years China has 
largely opened its economy and become one of the top U.S.’s trading 
partners, and, perhaps more importantly, our top creditor. They also 
continue to develop their military might to near-superpower status.64 
These factors are eroding the credibility of a firm U.S. stance on support 
for Taiwan. As the Bloomberg editorial staff so starkly frame the issue in 
2012: Are we really willing to lose Los Angeles in defense of Taiwan?65  
 In August 2012, President Barack Obama said in a press conference, “We 
have been very clear to the Assad regime, but also to other players on the 
ground, that a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical 
weapons moving around or being utilized. That would change my 
calculus.”66 The Assad regime evidently saw those threats as not credible, 
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because it subsequently used chemical weapons numerous times.67 
Assad’s assessment of the risk of such actions appeared to be correct, as 
there was no U.S. military response. 
 Russia’s 2014 takeover of Crimea began with a buildup of troops along 
the border in areas legally their own. This pushing of boundaries didn’t 
elicit any outside response, and Russia’s subsequent invasion and takeover 
of Crimea, then other parts of Ukraine, is classic piecemeal aggression, as 
each small step seems too little offense to warrant a real response.68  
C. THE UTILITY OF AMBIGUITY 
One of the most effective tools at our disposal in mitigating the weaknesses 
deriving from these problems is the introduction of measured ambiguity. This can be 
accomplished by sending signals of uncertainty, partial information, or disinformation. 
Perceived ambiguity can be a huge benefit in security strategy, as the enemy can no 
longer locate the limiting line of their behavior. By threatening when they are close to 
offending one’s established “rules,” but never being completely clear on where the line 
is, one is afforded greater latitude in taking context into account. Sharing or hinting at 
information about one’s lack of capabilities can incite uncertainty around the options one 
is able and willing to consider. Ensuring that different channels of information (e.g., 
diplomatic, military intelligence, public speeches) carry different messages can build 
great uncertainty. Too much ambiguity introduces the risk of decreasing one’s credibility, 
especially when paired with unexpected actions. But when properly scoped and managed, 
such purposeful apparent randomness can actually enhance credibility in the short and 
long terms. Maintaining gray areas can illustrate that one is willing to take context into 
account, but this will only be effective if some credibility exists on which to trade, and if 
aggressions outside that window are responded to forcefully. 
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The employment of real randomness in dealing with a limited set of options 
works in a similar way.69 If the only response action we have at our disposal is an attack 
out of proportion to an instigation, we might state a 10 percent chance of our using 
overwhelming force as a response to a more minor incursion. In the idealized world of 
pure theory, binding oneself to a random response generator that gave a 10 percent 
chance of massive reprisal should equal, in any rational individual’s mind, a response 10 
percent as great as the actual response should we carry it out 100 percent of the time. In 
reality no one would accept such a random response system (a Wheel of Fortune with a 
neutron bomb on the “bankrupt slice”?), nor would anyone believe that such a random 
decision would be similar to a lesser threat. But the utility of such an approach is difficult 
to deny and may offer a variety of advantages. The following chapter will illustrate that 
such processes are often inherent in political systems, and by pointing them out to our 
enemies we can take advantage of these “weaknesses” of the system. 
Numerous nuclear strategists have written about the utility of ambiguity, and it 
has been a part of nuclear strategy in practice almost incessantly for half a century. 
Though much of the ambiguity of the early years of the nuclear age focused the need for 
flexibility to deal with “lesser aggressions, such as the 1950 attack on South Korea,”70 by 
the mid-1960s military leaders like French general Gallois and McNamara, as well as 
civilian strategists like Brodie, Kahn and Schelling, were exploring in great detail how 
deliberately ambiguous policy could have a deterrent effect. Using game theory, 
Schelling attempted (with little success) to show how one might quantify precisely what 
value of randomness offers the best deterrent effect.71 Kahn took a less formal approach, 
instead relying entirely on reasoning and avoiding the formalization of statements and 
payoff matrices, but came to many of the same conclusions.72 Yet in a more practical 
frame, in 1961 Gallois argued that “a widely publicized but vague determination is more 
                                                 
69. Some may in fact consider it a category of ambiguity of action; I’m considering them separately 
here because some upcoming examples are best illustrated when considering them as distinct. 
70. Roger Hilsman, From Nuclear Military Strategy to a World without War: A History and a 
Proposal, 57. 
71. Thomas Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, 175–186. 
72. Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 158, 172. 
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valuable, that specific promises that cannot always be kept, and that would furnish the 
other side valuable indications as to the policy the latter could pursue with impunity.”73 
In his history of British nuclear policy, John Baylis summarized a variety of specific 
areas of policy ambiguity, including deterrence through punishment versus deterrence 
through denial;74 triggers for escalation; and whether one is trying to achieve minimal 
deterrence capability or nuclear superiority.75  
Baylis also argues that such attempts to sow uncertainty, undertaken by both sides 
of the Cold War nuclear stalemate, resulted in an incredibly foggy picture of how the 
nuclear world worked. These strategies bred great uncertainty about how likely nuclear 
war might be, how likely conventional war was to escalate, and how long such a war 
might last.76 In effect, nuclear strategy became all “about authoring cryptic texts, 
interpreting deliberately ambiguous messages, and orchestrating and interpreting 
symbolic performances—displays in which appearance is everything.”77 In short, 
uncertainty management became the order of the day, both an objective and a skill set. 
Writings about true chance (as opposed to uncertainty) were less common, and 
less well received. Schelling was again among the first, though as usual his 
recommendations were highly theoretical and took the form of metaphors. As an 
extension to his line of reasoning about purposeful apparent randomization of one’s 
actions, he proposed the following thought experiment.78 Imagine yourself chained to 
another person, both of you standing on the edge of a cliff. The first one to give up gets 
                                                 
73. Pierre Marie Gallois, The Balance of Terror: Strategy for the Nuclear Age (Houghton Mifflin, 
1961). 
74. That is, does a nation plan to launch a counterforce strike that will destroy an enemy’s ability to 
operate? Or is the plan to refrain until the enemy has destroyed parts of one’s own national interest, then 
respond with a strike on the offending nation’s cities and industry? John Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence: 
British Nuclear Strategy, 1945–1964, Nuclear History Program 4 (Oxford ; New York: Clarendon Press, 
1995). 
75. Ibid. These are themes throughout the book, but they are well summarized in the conclusion, 
particularly pages 360–378. 
76. Ibid., 5. 
77. Ron Hirschbein, Massing the Tropes: The Metaphorical Construction of American Nuclear 
Strategy (Westport, Conn: Praeger Security International, 2005). 
78. Really just a strategy to increase credibility by binding oneself to randomness to show you are 
really serious to about relying on chance.  
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nothing, but whoever holds out longest wins a significant sum of money. How might you 
increase your chances of winning? His proposal was to start dancing closer and closer to 
the edge of the cliff, acting like a madman.79 This is similar to the classic game-theoretic 
example of the game of chicken in which the payoff matrix will always encourage a 
rational opponent to swerve.80 When facing real (i.e., less than perfectly rational) 
opponents, one can increase chances of victory by getting drunk and then, while hurtling 
toward one’s opponent, remove the steering wheel and throw it out the window.81 The 
critical difference that distinguishes the dancing-madman example, however, is that in 
Schelling’s extreme game of chicken, your opponent has been put entirely in control and 
given a stark and certain choice: swerve or you will lose. In contrast, dancing on the edge 
of the cliff puts power in the hands of chance by introducing a constant threat of 
destruction to both. This is better described as: We are both on the verge of death with χ 
percent of falling at any time, and this will continue until you give in. Schelling would 
later make the distinction more clear in separately defining “impellance” and 
“compellance,”82 either of which may have a random component. 
Application of these theories to reality “led to conclusions that seemed quite 
bizarre to the military mind.”83 Stability, according to this approach, could only be 
achieved by limiting our own options in order to decrease the enemy’s incentives to make 
the choice it might otherwise prefer. In one Cold War example, to decrease the Soviets’ 
incentive to attack the West, NATO nations should maintain weapons stockpiles capable 
of surviving a massive first strike and delivering a response with overwhelming force (so 
                                                 
79. From classroom lectures described by former students. Michael Kinsley, “A Nobel Laureate Who’s 
Got Game,” Washington Post, October 12, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/10/11/AR2005101101336.html. 
80. Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict.   
The payoff matrix for a game of chicken would generally consist of a small positive value for a win or 
loss, but a large loss for a crash. There are four quadrants based on two axes, each a driver choosing 
whether to swerve or not. If both swerve the game is a tie. If one swerves the other wins, but not as much as 
both would lose in a crash if both stay the course. This indicates that staying the course is rational only if 
you have very good reason to believe your opponent will swerve. 
81. Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 176–177. 
82. Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence. 
83. Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 183. 
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far so good for the generals), but should not develop weapons accurate enough to disable 
the USSR’s military capabilities. “A weapon that can hurt only people, and cannot 
possibly damage the other side’s striking force, is profoundly defensive; it provides the 
possessor no incentive to strike first.”84 Counter-intuitively, ensuring our capabilities are 
less than those of our enemies, in certain ways, can lead to safety through stability. 
Forty years later, Hilsman argued that exactly this logic was part of the motivation 
behind many arms-control efforts for the remainder of the Cold War. Weapons-reduction 
treaties often tried to increase second-strike options at the expense of first-strike 
capabilities in an attempt to increase stability. The START-II treaty which drastically 
reduced the number of Multiple Independently-targeted Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) was 
indicative of this approach, as a single MIRV increased the number of targets that could 
be struck in an initial attack while decreasing the number of targets an enemy needed to 
hit to totally disable one’s capabilities.85 As counterintuitive as it may seem at first 
glance, we were achieving better security by reducing our capabilities and increasing the 
uncertainty that we would be able to incapacitate our enemies. 
D. NUCLEAR STRATEGY LESSONS FOR TERRORISM 
Modern work on terrorism has a few parallels with nuclear deterrence strategies. 
Most fundamentally, as in the Cold War, we are facing enemies that we could destroy 
utterly on the battlefield, but a pyrrhic victory would be a possible outcome and the 
methods by which we could “defeat” our enemies would clash intensely with America’s 
view of itself. Just as Herman Kahn was vilified for decades as a bloodthirsty advocate of 
murder for his support of first-strike nuclear options, any heavy-handed and high-casualty 
response to terrorists results in cries of immoral overreaction. Israel wrestles with this 
ethical dilemma/public relations problem during every Intifada. An out-of-proportion 
response erodes a nation’s self-identity as the “good guys” from within, and diminishes 
                                                 
84. Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 233. 
85. Negotiated by Clinton and Yeltsin, the START-II (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, second round) 
agreement was never officially adopted but it still led to the retirement of The United States’ newest, 
largest, and most advanced MIRV, the MX missiles which could each accurately strike 10 separate targets 
with 300 kt warheads, as well as many of Russia’s MIRVs.  Roger Hilsman, From Nuclear Military 
Strategy to a World without War: A History and a Proposal, 111. 
 28
the moral authority required to operate internationally. It causes enemies to multiply, and 
the trust that is necessary to form working relationships with allies is reduced. 
Refraining from full use of force is, however, different in fundamental ways in 
these two different types of threats. Counterterrorism policy can only be called 
“deterrence” using the broadest of definitions.86 Classic deterrence impels enemies to 
behave in desired ways by threatening something they value with destruction, capture, 
etc., even though what is threatened is often not directly related to the action one is trying 
to discourage (or encourage, in some cases).87 Real deterrence includes implicit promises 
to refrain from specific types of attacks as long as the enemy behaves acceptably. In 
contrast, counter-terrorist operatives generally do not promise, implicitly or otherwise, to 
refrain from action until terrorists have carried out an attack. Counterterrorist strategy 
instead focuses on prevention of all attacks, as much as is possible.88 Attacks on terrorists 
and their bases are designed not to deter (convincing them to act in a certain way for fear 
of future attack) but to decrease their capabilities, thereby preventing future attacks. 
Despite these key differences, the question remains: if we refrain from use of 
force in some instances, and use it in other instances, how do we develop doctrine or 
policy on when force should be employed? And from either our current preventative 
approach or a theoretical deterrence approach, would it be beneficial to have a publicly 
declared, clear policy on when we will and will not choose to use different levels of 
force? 
                                                 
86. This is not to say that some do not view counterterrorism policies as "deterrent." Major Douglas 
Tippet summarized such a viewpoint in a 2009 master's thesis. Douglas Tippet. “Deterring Terrorism: A 
Framework for Making Retaliatory Threats Credible.” Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009; 
Boaz Ganor, as mentioned earlier, argues that suicide bombers can be deterred if they “result in a response 
so severe that their loss would exceed any befit they hope to gain.” Boaz Ganor, The Counter-Terrorism 
Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers, 79. 
87. Schelling’s distinction between impelling an enemy and compelling an enemy is again relevant 
here. To impel is to threaten our own response if the enemy takes a certain action. Compellence, on the 
other hand, is starting a painful action (e.g., sanctions or occupation) that will stop when the enemy makes 
a specific decision. I use the terms in the same way here. 
88. A possible counterexample of this is our more classical-style deterrence of “rogue” nations from 
supporting terrorism. The U.S. has often threatened unfriendly nations with retribution if they are found to 
support terrorists looking to attack the West. But this is not deterrence of terrorism directly in that the 
terrorists are not being deterred from their actions, rather they are being deprived of resources by deterring 
a national government. As such, this type of deterrence is really a method of prevention in that it is not 
trying to affect the intentions, but rather the capabilities of the enemy in question (i.e., terrorists). 
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This question may be even more complicated than it seems. To arrive at even a 
rough answer, we must examine what clarity of policy entails, which is itself difficult. 
Then we must investigate the implications of working to increase clarity—or 
alternatively, striving to increase ambiguity—under different types of circumstances, 
referencing as necessary the literature from terrorism studies and from nuclear strategy. 
Finally, ethical and philosophical implications of an open society intentionally decreasing 
openness must be considered and weighed against possible gains in security. These three 
steps will comprise the remainder of this thesis.  
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III. DEFINING UNCERTAINTY 
Having shown that using ambiguity and uncertainty showed theoretical promise 
and real results during the Cold War, the next step is to determine how these ideas might 
be applied in the realm of counterterrorism theory. To do so, the terms in use must be 
more clearly defined and explained. 
A. CLASSES OF UNCERTAINTY 
Clarity of understanding may seem, at first thought, fairly easy to describe. It 
includes an understanding of both the concept in question and the context within which it 
is found, as well as their relationship with that context. It must be noted that good 
understanding is never perfect, in that there will always remain some uncertainty if only 
because we are far from omniscient beings and the world within which we operate is a 
complex place. Additionally, any change within the system is likely to, at least 
temporarily, diminish one’s ability to understand it, and uncertainty will increase. But in 
many familiar situations we can claim to have a good understanding, and that’s usually 
enough to meet our decision-making needs. A mechanic might have excellent 
understanding of how an engine works, what problems it is likely to experience in 
different types of situations, and a knowledge of common failures to watch out for. 
Similarly a commander might know all of the individuals serving under him and, by 
knowing everyone’s strengths and weaknesses and by referring back to past leadership 
experience, have a good understanding of his unit’s capabilities. However, any changes 
will at least temporarily diminish understanding. 
At the other end of the spectrum, someone with no understanding of military 
operations dropped into the middle of an active battlefield will perceive only chaos. He 
would have no understanding of the problem space, and little understanding of the 
objectives, strategies or tactics employed. 
Different models of understanding—the flip side of the same coin as 
uncertainty—have been proposed through the years, but a few are of particular interest in 
their relevancy to this topic. Albert Wohlstetter and the RAND Corporation popularized 
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“systems theory” in the 1950s as an approach to strategy, and it came to be applied to a 
huge variety of problems (technical, financial, political, etc.). At its heart was “the 
capacity of viewing problems as a whole, rather than in fragmented components, and to 
master complexity.”89 Complex systems analysis has continued to grow this concept ever 
since, and is still applied to a huge variety of problems. Where systems theory met 
knowledge management, David Snowden described a “social ecology of knowledge” as a 
stop on the way to creating his now-famous Cynefin sense-making framework.90  
Basically the model contrasts certainty of decision making and our level of 
certainty in our understanding of the situation. If we are confident in both 
then we are dealing with the known knowns. If we know [understand] the 
situation but we are not sure of the consequences of our decisions then we 
are dealing with the known unknowns. If we are pretty certain our 
decisions will do no harm (an early expression of safe-fail experiments) 
and will help us understand what is possible then we are dealing with the 
unknown knowns. Then of course we have the really interesting area, both 
for threat and opportunity, where, when it comes down to it we have no 
idea what is going on or what we should do.91  
Snowden dubbed this final category “unknown unknowns,” a term that Defense 
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld would go on to infamously, though accurately, use in 
discussing the dangers of Iraq.92 
In the discussions of uncertainty to follow, it is important to note that discussion 
will center largely on Snowden’s known unknowns and unknown knowns. Known 
knowns—situations in which we understand the context and what is likely to be the result 
of our actions—may be relevant when talking about disinformation, but only when part 
of a broader campaign of inconsistent information to confuse the enemy rather than 
solely to mislead. Pure disinformation campaigns in which we suspect we know how the 
enemy will respond are not attempting to create uncertainty, but certainty about untruths. 
                                                 
89. To a modern eye, the idea of “mastering complexity” seems a bit naïve. Freedman, The Evolution 
of Nuclear Strategy, 168–170. 
90. David Snowden, “The Social Ecology of Knowledge Management,” in Knowledge Horizons: The 
Present and the Promise of Knowledge Management, ed. Charles Despres and Daniele Chauvel (Boston: 
Butterworth-Heinemann, 2000), 237–66.   
91. David Snowden, “The Origins of Cynefin,” Cognitive Edge, 2010, www.cognitive-edge.com. 
92. Ibid.  
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Unknown unknowns are irrelevant to the discussion for the opposite reason: if we 
have no idea what the situation is, or the effect our decisions might make, there is no 
certainty whatsoever. As “uncertainty” requires some understanding, i.e., a middle 
ground between excellent understanding and complete confusion, a situation full of 
unknown unknowns provides no place to stand. Trying to craft recommendations for such 
a chaotic realm would be a different type of task entirely. 
Instead, this paper’s focus is at the edge of knowledge, in which we have a good 
(if always imperfect) understanding of the problem space but are unsure of the 
implications of our decisions (known unknowns); or situations when we have a pretty 
good idea of what the outcomes of our decisions would be (in a general sense) but do not 
have much understanding of the system within which we are operating. These are the 
types of situations in which an understanding and leveraging of our lack of understanding 
might provide some benefit. Or, in other cases, we may gain advantage by shifting 
circumstances to increase uncertainty either of the problem space or our own actions.  
B. INHERENT VS. INTRODUCED UNCERTAINTIES 
To begin a more thorough analysis, we must first recognize that some 
uncertainties are inherent and cannot be avoided, whereas others have been introduced by 
one side or the other. Inherent uncertainties are most often the result of the complexity of 
the world in which we operate. Physical complex systems like the vagaries of the weather 
must be dealt with every day, and their effects cascade through our lives and through our 
operations. In a simple example, the accuracy of any single missile will be dependent on 
temperature and wind as well as its technology. For a weapon that does not have “smart” 
systems capable of correcting for the weather, accuracy will be quite poor unless there is 
virtually no wind, and even then thrust will be uneven and unpredictable enough that 
rudimentary guidance systems are unable to provide much help. Accuracy can be 
increased (i.e., uncertainty about its expected effectiveness decreased) by adding smart-
adaptive guidance technology that monitors changes as they happen and makes 
corrections.  
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Such inherent physical-system uncertainties are commonplace, and can be much 
more complicated. Operations researchers have been working for sixty years to analyze 
efficiencies of all types of weapons and tactics, often focusing on quantifying the likely 
success rates of different types of strategies.93 Given a specific setup of anti-aircraft 
batteries, how many bombers are needed to obtain, for example, a 90 percent chance of 
success in destroying a specific facility? To answer such a question one must analyze the 
likely effectiveness of the explosives being used, the accuracy of the weapons, the 
targeting abilities of the crews, the likelihood that a certain number of aircraft will 
survive the mission (the percentage of which will differ depending on how many are 
sent), the effects of night versus day, the effects of different weather patterns, etc. These 
are all examples of inherent uncertainties, often interacting with and magnifying one 
another, and most are based on physical system complexities.  
Another type of uncertainty is that which is inherent in the complexity of the 
human systems we build. Far less research has been done on this, but there are a variety 
of theories that have tried to explain the roots of such uncertainties. Most focus on the 
fact that human systems are made up of individuals with competing interests, which 
results in dynamic systems of sufficient complexity that their actions cannot be accurately 
predicted.94 Baylis identifies three sources of uncertainty in political systems. The 
Bureaucratic Politics Approach highlights the complexities and infighting inherent in 
large political systems. The Belief Systems Approach focuses on the “belief systems” of 
the individuals and groups that make up the system, and the Strategic Culture Approach 
is similar to Belief Systems but grants more weight to the cultural touchstones and group 
norms that guide our behavior more subtly.95 
A second class of uncertainties pertains to those that are introduced to situations 
purposefully by one side or the other, as opposed to being inherent within the system. As 
a simple example, consider a boxer’s feint that briefly confuses his opponent. This is an 
                                                 
93. Hugh J. Miser, “Craft in Operations Research.” Operations Research 40, no. 4 (July 1, 1992): 633–
39. doi:10.2307/170996. 
94. John Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence, 8.  
95. Ibid. Most of the book is organized around these concepts, and how they are perceived to have 
determined British military strategy. 
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analogue to the movement of military forces in the field, often designed to be difficult to 
understand from the enemy’s perspective. At a tactical level, such misdirection is critical 
to any kind of success in conflict, as it is almost always unwise to act entirely predictably. 
At higher strategic levels, however, introducing ambiguity about one’s intent or 
capabilities is just as critical. The secrecy in which strategic military plans are held is 
matched in energy by the analysis of what picture should be presented to the enemy. If 
we have a force advantage, is it better to broadcast or obfuscate that fact? If we have a 
new weapons technology, should we share details about how it works to prove its 
viability and provide deterrent influence, or hold it in reserve for use as a surprise 
advantage? Might we even degrade our own capabilities, as recommended by some 
theorists, to increase the uncertainty about whether we are a true threat to an enemy in an 
effort to increase stability?  
C. FACT VS. INTENT 
The distinction between inherent physical system and human system ambiguities 
discussed above hints at, but does not correlate with, another distinction that is important 
to this investigation: ambiguity of fact versus ambiguity of intent. Facts can be true or 
false, but they do have clear truth values that exist outside one’s perception even if it may 
be impossible to know them for sure. An example of factual ambiguity is uncertainty 
over how many troops the enemy has, and in what locations. Intent, on the other hand, 
has no external truth value in this way in that it is merely a construct within my or my 
enemy’s mind.96 As such it is fleeting, changeable, and exceedingly varied. Even I may 
not be certain of my own intent at times; my enemy must always be working to guess at 
my intent from 1) observable fact, which might through disinformation be made 
uncertain; and 2) my statements of intent, which may or may not reflect my true intent 
and will be weighed based on how credible my statement appears. 
                                                 
96. This is not necessarily true when the “intent” in question is that of a group, as “intent” when 
speaking in human system terms might often be said have an external value constantly negotiated by the 
group. This will be addressed in more detail below in discussing Baylis and Rosenberg, but for the purpose 
of this section and to properly outline the dynamics of uncertainty as modeled here, intent will be assumed 
to have no external truth value.  
 36
Explicit separation of fact and intent is merely a broader generalization of the 
capability/will dichotomy that has long been recognized as foundational in political and 
military affairs. Clausewitz maintained that the purpose of war is to break an enemy’s 
will, which may be done with or without destroying his ability to fight.97 More recently, 
Robert Pape has written extensively on “coercion,” describing three different methods of 
breaking an enemy’s will by destroying different sets of interests.98 Even the Department 
of Defense Joint Operating Plan JP 5–0 is careful to discuss how certain types of attacks 
may increase uncertainty about facts on the ground in the mind of enemy leaders. This 
uncertainty may lead to more rapid collapse or, in different circumstances, might result in 
a slower surrender as the enemy is unaware of how badly he is losing.99 
Because understanding of intent and understanding of the facts of a given context 
both derive from the same data points, there is some directional overlap of understanding 
(and thereby uncertainty) of fact and intent. Such understanding flows only in one 
direction, however, from perceived fact to assumed intent. The reason for this: When 
working to understand an enemy’s intent, one must assume some level of rationality, else 
any predictions of what the enemy is likely to do would be impossible. Given the 
assumption of rationality, intent can be assumed to be bounded by what is possible given 
the specifics of the situation, and directed by what an enemy knows and is likely to 
believe about his best options. Therefore, understanding of an enemy’s intent is merely a 
derivation of known facts, and thus to manipulate an enemy’s understanding of facts is to 
shift their understanding of both facts and intent.  
                                                 
97., Carl von Clausewitz. On War.  
98. Robert Anthony Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War, Cornell Studies in 
Security Affairs. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1996. 
99. Joint Operational Planning, “Joint Publication (JP) 5–0.” Department of Defense, August 2011. 
Specific examples of this problem were outlined in a recent article in Military Review, which describes 
how poor situational awareness by the Iraqi military, caused by US destruction of Iraqi operational centers 
of gravity, delayed Iraqi surrender. Colonel William G. Pierce, and Colonel Robert C. Coon. 
“Understanding the Link Between Center of Gravity and Mission Accomplishment.” Military Review, 76–
84. It is worth noting that, although there is a section of JP 5–0 titled "Creating Understanding and 
Reducing Uncertainty" there is no mention made of managing, leveraging or increasing uncertainty. Page I-
5. 
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Intent on the other hand, not being observable, cannot be used to help determine 
facts except in a general, strategic-intelligence manner. For example, “based on what the 
enemy is known to have done in the past, what are his current likely objectives?” This is 
not knowledge per se so much as a weighting mechanism, however. It also assumes past 
intent from observed facts, thus bringing us back to the original directionality of intent 
derived from facts. 
D. CLARIFICATION OF TERMS 
Now that the “uncertainty” and “ambiguity” have been analyzed in a bit more 
detail we are ready to establish more specific definitions of the terms as they are used in 
this thesis. There is much overlap in meaning between the two, and to this point they may 
appear to have been used interchangeably. Each was chosen specifically to best fit its 
context; however, based on this distinction: uncertainty is a perception of ambiguity. As 
such, uncertainty cannot exist without human interpretation of perceptions; conversely, 
using these definitions uncertainty can exist entirely independent from any real ambiguity 
if one has an imperfect understanding of reality. 
This distinction is important in order to differentiate between actual 
randomness100 and lack of understanding, both or either of which can be the result of 
actions we might take to increase uncertainty. These terms loosely correlate with the 
classifications above. Ambiguity, for example, might refer to the factual likelihood that a 
missile will hit its target. This bit of randomness exists before and outside of human 
perception of that ambiguity. Uncertainty is the term used when discussing the lack of 
perfect understanding about where it is going to hit. Sometimes this will also be referred 
to as perceived ambiguity, because given these definitions uncertainty is almost perfectly 
synonymous with perceived ambiguity. 
This becomes more complicated is when discussing introduced ambiguities. 
When purposefully introducing systemic, factual ambiguities—for example, by degrading 
our own nuclear missile targeting capabilities as recommended by Schelling and Kahn—
                                                 
100. More accurately, this “randomness” is actually sufficient systemic complexity that the subject in 
question cannot be understood. This is perceived as randomness, and usually described as such. 
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uncertainty (i.e., lack of understanding) about reality will be rooted in actual 
ambiguities.101 On the other hand, when we use disinformation as a tool to obfuscate 
facts, the lack of clarity we create is more accurately termed uncertainty. This is because 
the lack of understanding we are introducing is more perception than reality, and 
furthermore likely to exist only on the part of the enemy.  
Similarly, most of the time when we are talking about ambiguous intent we will 
use the term “uncertainty.” There will be cases, however, in which we are discussing 
situations in which one’s intent is uncertain even to oneself. This happens when intent is 
confused as a result of complexity of a system within which we are operating, either 
physical or political. For example, I may be unsure of whether or not I will launch a 
specific attack because I’m uncertain about an incoming weather system that might cause 
problems with our strategy, or because I am waiting on word from high up in the 
command about whether to more forward with the attack. This bleeding of factual 
ambiguities into ambiguities of intent will also affect our thinking and our terminology, 
and we will be more likely to use “ambiguity” rather than “uncertainty” to reflect the 
roots of the uncertainty in system complexity rather than in individual perception. 
Figure 1 illustrates this differentiation. In general, when considering inherent 
ambiguities of fact they will be referred to as “ambiguities,” as will be introduced 
ambiguities of fact that result from purposefully increased physical system ambiguities. 
This is represented by the area above the dotted-line diagonal across the diagram. The 
area below the dotted line encompasses the situations in which the term “uncertainty” is 
more appropriate, as perception is in those cases more germane than reality. This is true 
regardless of whether the ambiguities exist in reality or merely in one’s perception. 
                                                 
101. This is because such an introduced ambiguity is actually a purposeful increase of the inherent 
ambiguities of fact. 
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Figure 1.  Conceptual map of uncertainty and ambiguity 
One final note on the term “uncertainty”: as touched on early in this chapter, it 
refers to a situation in which one has some understanding but insufficient information to 
reach a reasonably confident conclusion. As such it can be thought of as the middle 
ground between other options. Does the enemy plan to attack or not? If we convince him 
we do not plan to attack when we actually are, we are not increasing uncertainty but 
rather increasing certainty of an untruth. This can certainly have advantages as well, but 
is outside the scope of this thesis and so will only be discussed in passing where relevant. 
Instead this work will focus on taking advantage of situations in which we make our 
enemy unsure of something as a strategic play, or when making everyone more uncertain 
—ourselves included—might be helpful. 
Having established a more thorough theoretical understanding of what is meant 
by “uncertainty” and “ambiguity,” the next section will progress to an analysis of how the 
various classes of uncertainty have been beneficial in practice in the past and how they 
may be likely to provide future advantages when addressing the threat of terrorism. 
 40
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 41
IV. FOUR CLASSES OF UNCERTAINTY 
Ambiguity and uncertainty are abstract concepts, difficult to understand without 
illustrative examples. The preceding pages defined and categorized these concepts into 
four different types based on two separate axes: inherent versus introduced, and 
uncertainty of fact versus uncertainty of intent. A distinction was also made between 
uncertainty and ambiguity: namely that ambiguity is centered outside any individual’s 
observation, whereas uncertainty resides in an observer’s perception. This chapter will 
attempt to bring these categorizations down to earth, addressing each in turn, describing 
its characteristics and presenting examples of past use and opportunities in which each 
might be helpful again. 
A. INHERENT FACTUAL AMBIGUITIES: RANDOMNESS AND 
LEARNING  
The world is an incredibly complex place, and every day we have to deal with 
inherent uncertainties because of the apparent randomness that comes with that 
complexity. Weather patterns, the behavior of political and economic systems, the 
likelihood that a certain number of bombers will make it through the enemy’s defenses, 
the chances of getting selected for a more thorough pat-down by airport security, the 
likelihood that a bomb of a certain size will take down a building; all of these are 
examples of an inherent uncertainty of fact, which might also be described as perceived 
inherent factual ambiguity. We generally measure such uncertainties as percent-chance, 
for example “an 80 percent chance that the target will be at least 90 percent destroyed,” 
or “a 95 percent chance that a knife of at least two inches will be caught by this baggage 
scanner.” We tend to think of them in terms of how they might be minimized.  
Over time, as we gain knowledge and technology, these types of uncertainties are 
often reduced. This happens through two different mechanisms. First, new technology 
often corrects for incurable complexities. For example, advanced missile guidance 
systems adjust for wind or uneven thrust in real time. In these cases we are not removing 
the source of uncertainty—we still cannot understand and predict wind patterns—but new 
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tools allow us to mitigate, correct for or avoid those system uncertainties. The second 
mechanism goes further. Researchers sometimes come to understand the complexities of 
a system well enough that they become able to make accurate predictions, thus reducing 
or even removing the uncertainty. This is a common solution for less complex systems. 
Similarly, especially in complex social systems, improved knowledge might allow us to 
craft alternate improved systems that the uncertainty simply evaporates.  
Working to reduce uncertainty about the world is a basic part of being human. It 
is a result of learning, applying and sharing of knowledge, identified by economists as the 
main component of productivity growth and responsible over time for raising standards 
of living from subsistence to what we know today.102 With only brief consideration, 
better understanding all the details of how the world works would seem to have no 
drawbacks. However, I would argue that in certain situations, specific types of lesser 
understanding can be a security advantage. 
To start, there is at least one obvious situation in which lesser understanding can 
be advantageous: knowledge possessed by one’s enemy. Increasing an enemy’s 
uncertainty of facts will very often work to one’s advantage. This is sometimes the case 
even if one’s own understanding suffers as well. Such disinformation campaigns are a 
standard part of the intelligence game, but by themselves are not the prime focus of this 
thesis. 
More interesting to this project is whether there are situations in which existing, 
inherent ambiguities that limit our own understanding of facts can be leveraged to our 
advantage. Inherent factual ambiguities as we define them may include any complex 
system effects that are beyond our full understanding. Weather patterns, as discussed 
above, are one good example. Another would be shifts in public opinion, or changes in 
the political system that result either from the passage of time or changes in national 
                                                 
102. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that more than half of productivity growth is due to 
increases in nowledge: Robert Shackleton, “Total Factor Productivity Growth in Historical Perspective” 
(Congressional Budget Office, March 2013), 
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/44002_TFP_Growth_03–18–2013.pdf; for a more detailed analysis 
of this process, see James D Adams, “Fundamental Stocks of Knowledge and Productivity Growth,” 
Journal of Political Economy, 1990, 673–702. 
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priorities. Another, relevant to the topic at hand, is trying to predict the growth, evolution 
or emergence of terrorist groups. Any time we work at the boundaries of our predictive 
capabilities, inherent factual ambiguity comes into play. 
To consider how uncertainty from such ambiguity might confer an advantage, we 
can look back to Schelling’s Strategy of Conflict. He wrote at length on how binding 
oneself in fact is one of the best ways to communicate credibility to an enemy. 
Weaknesses—including the lack of perfect understanding—can sometimes be put to use 
in just such a way. Schelling argues that almost every conflict is really a bargaining 
situation, and bargaining is solved when one side decides that the other would not offer a 
better solution than the existing option. Therefore, if I have the power to create a variety 
of options, my opponent will have much greater expectations of the range of options 
available to him for a deal. One example used by Schelling involves two cars entering an 
intersection at the same time. Neither wishes a collision, but if Driver A is bound by 
circumstance to continue moving forward, Driver B will be influenced to grant right of 
way to A even if he does not wish to. Other examples might be Driver A pulling a heavy 
trailer, traveling downhill on an icy road, or even not being able to see Driver B.103 Any 
of these would be a hindrance to the Driver A in general terms, making it much more 
questionable as to whether he would be able to avoid a collision. In the question of who 
has the right of way, however, her more limited options would offer a definite advantage 
as long as Driver B understands the situation. A clear decision has now been given to 
Driver B: cause an accident in which we both lose, or grant the right of way to Driver A. 
This concept offers lessons for security policy-makers. Numerous Cold War 
strategists wrote the destabilizing effects of better weapons; an overestimation of U.S. 
capabilities by the USSR would result in the Soviets perceiving no alternative to a 
surprise-first strike against us. A comparison can also be made with terrorists who have 
declared themselves enemies of the U.S. in contemporary times. An overestimation of 
our power on their part leads to a belief that the U.S. military never makes mistakes and 
                                                 
103. Thomas Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, Chapter 2. This example is not exactly that used by 
Schelling—he wrote of two dynamite trucks meeting on a narrow mountain road—but uses the same 
theoretical arguments. 
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that allied nations always act according to our will. Thus, targeting failures are assumed 
to be purposeful attacks on civilian populations, and extreme actions taken by U.S.-
supported states are assumed to have been done at our command. 
Put into practice, taking advantage of existing inherent factual ambiguities might 
mean working to convince terrorists that our capabilities are not as extensive as they 
might believe. This may take the form of highlighting situations in which we also 
suffered from our failures, especially if those who are clearly our enemies gained from 
those mistakes. We might point out past examples of our inability to effect restraint on 
allied nations or client states or, when possible, demonstrate our own lack of abilities in 
achieving our objectives in circumstances similar to those that terrorists find particularly 
objectionable. 
As with Kahn’s recommendations, highlighting our weaknesses might seem 
bizarre to some, but in some situations doing so may be advantageous. 
B. INTRODUCED FACTUAL AMBIGUITIES: INTELLIGENCE, 
DISINFORMATION, AND HAMPERING ONESELF  
The heart of intelligence is gathering and analyzing facts about the enemy to 
determine facts about his situation, which in turn should yield clues as to his intent. An 
enemy generally strives to hide his capabilities and intent from us by secrecy and public 
exaggeration, or minimization, of the facts. The process of intelligence gathering strives 
to distill truth out of a mass of diverse and confusing facts. This reduction of uncertainty 





literature.104 More interesting and less well researched is the question of when it is to our 
advantage to broadcast truths about ourselves, and when it makes more sense to publicly 
(or semi-publicly) lie about our capabilities, organization, policies or technologies.105 
At first glance it appears beneficial to tell the truth about our strengths, to 
demonstrate how difficult it will be to attack us and thus deter such attacks, and lie about 
our weaknesses to keep from revealing where we might be most easily attacked. But the 
truth is far more complicated. At times we might lie about our strengths as well, as every 
strength can become a weakness if it is targeted effectively. A good example is the 
lengths that intelligence services go to obscure the sources of their intelligence. 
Sometimes one might not use intelligence if doing so could reveal the source.106  
However it might be used, a strategy of disinformation will only be introducing 
uncertainty on the side of the enemy. To fully take advantage of the strategy as discussed 
here, one would need to introduce uncertainty to the situation as a whole, including on 
one’s own side. Introducing factual ambiguities can work in the same way as taking 
advantage of inherent ambiguities as discussed in the section above. An example we’ve 
already seen is the decommissioning of our MX missile fleet. This hampering of our own 
                                                 
104. As summarized by the Richard Betts: “Analytic certainty is precluded by ambiguity of evidence, 
ambivalence of judgment and atrophy of institutional reforms designed to avert failures,” but intelligence 
practitioners themselves do an excellent job reducing that uncertainty. “In most cases of mistakes in 
predicting attacks or in assessing operations, the inadequacy of critical data or their submergence in a 
viscous bureaucracy were at best the proximate causes of failure. The ultimate causes of error in most cases 
have been wishful thinking, cavalier disregard of professional analysts, and, above all, the premises and 
preconceptions of the policy makers.”  Richard K. Betts, “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence 
Failures Are Inevitable,” World Politics 31, no. 1 (October 1978): 61–89. This is consistent with other 
writings as well, for example Erik J. Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from 
Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and Beyond (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013). Some have gone 
so far as to quantify the uncertainty reductions of given intelligence products, e.g., Donald Barr and E. 
Todd Sherrill, “Measuring Information Gain in Tactical Operations,” Technical Report of the Operations 
Research Center (U.S. Military Academy, West Point, July 1996). 
105. All examples of facts about ourselves. 
106. In just one of many examples, in World War II, Allied use of Ultra intercepts that were decoded 
using the Enigma machine were sometimes not put to good use for fear the Germans would learn of their 
broken codes. In one of the earliest uses of this intelligence, the Battle of Crete in May 1941, the use of this 
intelligence source was so hampered by the restrictions around its use that the formidable New Zealanders 
were overrun by German paratroopers even though decoded transmissions gave every detail of the attack. 
John Keegan, Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al-Qaeda. (New York: 
Knopf, 2003), Chapter 5: Crete: Foreknowledge No Help. 
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capabilities, which increased the uncertainty of our ability to perform a successful first 
strike,107 reduced Soviet incentives to attack NATO first. 
In many instances, ambiguously crafted doctrine or security policy seems to be 
taking advantage of this approach as well. For example, unclear or contradictory policy 
around whether the U.S. allows torture seems designed to make it unclear to the enemy 
what they may have to face if they are captured.108 Such disinformation is an example of 
introduced factual uncertainty only on the side of the enemy, as we do have a policy but 
have at times lied about it.109 On another level, this ambiguity is doubtless due at least in 
part to differing opinions within the U.S. policy-making system, which makes it an 
inherent factual ambiguity resulting from the complexity of the political system. Finally, 
it may be—at least by some—a purposeful introduction of factual uncertainty about 
whether or not the U.S. will torture prisoners, designed to make uncertainty to the other 
side fully credible by cementing even within our own ranks uncertainty about what actual 
policy might be.110 
The previous section mentioned public reaction as an inherent factual ambiguity. 
One can never be certain what actions or events might capture the public imagination and 
foment a political movement that has the power to vote politicians out of office, or even 
topple governments. This might happen politically, for example, by a vote of no 
                                                 
107. It should be noted that submarine-based Trident missiles probably had sufficient capability from 
the beginning of the MX program to launch an overwhelming first strike regardless of the status of the MX 
missiles, so the existing of the MX fleet was simply offering non-mobile targets without increasing 
capability by very much. Roger Hilsman, From Nuclear Military Strategy to a World without War: A 
History and a Proposal. Nevertheless, the point stands that any decrease of our first strike capabilities (so 
long as counter-city capabilities were maintained) would be stabilizing regardless of whether that was the 
case historically. Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. 
108. Indeed, this was the argument of many when public debate about torture first took place in The 
United States at the height of Operation Iraqi Freedom; Major Christopher B. Shaw, “The International 
Proscription Against Torture And The United States’ Categorical And Qualified Responses,” Boston 
College International and Comparative Law Review 32, no. 2 (April 2009): 289–303. 
109. Ibid. 
110. Both the USSR and the U.S. each had certain projects during the Cold War on which they spent 
billions despite overwhelming expert opinion that the technologies being researched would never work. 
This was done in large part to increase credibility that they were on the verge of a breakthrough, thus 
intimidating their enemies. Brian Michael Jenkins, Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? (Amherst, N.Y: 
Prometheus Books, 2008); Justin Schumacher, “Red Mercury, Real Conspiracies, and Strategic Waste,” 
Medium Homeland Security Collection, accessed February 8, 2015, https://medium.com/homeland-
security/red-mercury-real-conspiracies-and-strategic-waste-fe754b968780. 
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confidence in a political system or wave of overturned incumbents in a representative 
democracy. In less stable regimes, removals from office could happen by force. Many 
other such inherent factual ambiguities can be introduced, as well. In one’s own country, 
setting the stage to have specific politicians unseated might provide a strategic advantage 
in political battles with definite security-policy implications.111 On the world stage, such 
uncertainties might be created by supporting or withdrawing support for different 
coalitions in unstable countries, leaving fewer options for enemies by increasing the 
possibility of emergent, unwanted results from their actions. This type of strategy was 
frequently used to brutal effect during the Kissinger years and is emblematic of the 
Realist school of political thought.112 
Introducing uncertainty about reality to all involved parties is necessarily going to 
trickle down into uncertainty of intent, as well, because every individual or government’s 
intent is rooted in and limited by facts on the ground. Thus, introduced uncertainties of 
intent will be the next category discussed. 
C. INTRODUCED UNCERTAINTIES OF INTENT: CREDIBILITY AND 
BINDING ONESELF  
This category of uncertainty is all about credibility. Are one’s public 
pronouncements believable? When should one strive to be credible, and when is it 
preferable that the enemy is unsure of whether to believe pronouncements about one’s 
intent?  
In the early days of the Cold War, Warner Schilling wrote about the problem of 
acting predictably, ethically, using the parable of the squash court, discussed in Chapter 
2. According to this thought experiment, being too predictably adherent to one’s moral 
code is a fatal weakness. Schilling’s conclusion was that our only choices were to 
convince the Soviets that our spite was more powerful than our ethics. By increasing the 
uncertainty about what were willing to do, we influenced an enemy’s decisions from one 
end of the spectrum, from a point near certainty that we would not possesses the mettle to 
                                                 
111.Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence. 
112.Thomas Schwartz, “Henry Kissinger: Realism, Domestic Politics, and the Struggle against 
Exceptionalism in American Foreign Policy,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 22, no. 1 (March 2011): 121–41. 
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perform a massive counter-population strike if we’d already lost the war, to an uncertain 
place in the middle. Even better, according to this philosophy, was the idea of a 
doomsday machine over which we have no control.113 This would further increase the 
credibility of our claim that any first strike would be met with apocalyptic results, but in 
this case it would do so by reducing uncertainty in the opposite direction, toward a 
certainty consistent with our claimed intent. 
Kahn, as mentioned above, recognized the dangers of such a doomsday machine 
and recommended a different course. Dancing on the edge of the cliff, metaphorically 
speaking, increases uncertainty about one’s intent by increasing the factual uncertainty of 
a given scenario. This illustrates the lesson that if one’s enemy might be convinced of an 
intent that you do not want them to be convinced of, anything that forces his opinion in 
the other direction may be a benefit. This might be accomplished by decreasing certainty 
about the outcome of a scenario, or by increasing certainty of the opposite conclusion. 
Either is likely to have the desired effect, but each comes with its own risks. 
Just like ambiguity of fact, uncertainty about intent can be introduced only to the 
enemy or to both one’s enemy and oneself. Also like ambiguity of fact, introducing the 
uncertainty on only the enemy’s side may be more useful in that we maintain better 
understanding of a given situation, but it is less powerful in that it is likely to be less 
credible.  
Uncertainty of intent can be a powerful, if unpredictable, diplomatic tool. It gives 
one’s opponent in any bargaining scenario the opportunity to interpret intent in different 
ways. The USSR commonly expressed different policies in public than in diplomatic 
channels.114 This strategy provides a political out to leaders while demonstrating 
flexibility to the enemy. Just such a situation occurred in perhaps the most dangerous 
days of the Cold War. The Cuban Missile Crisis saw the U.S. facing down the USSR 
over nuclear missiles that had been installed in Cuba. Both sides had talked themselves 
                                                 
113. Roger Hilsman, From Nuclear Military Strategy to a World without War: A History and a 
Proposal, 50. 
114.Roger Hilsman, From Nuclear Military Strategy to a World without War: A History and a 
Proposal, 68. 
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into a corner with statements of inflexibility. At the peak of the crisis, Khrushchev 
publicly stated on a radio broadcast that the missiles would stay, and a Soviet cable to 
Kennedy demanded the removal of NATO missiles from Turkey in exchange for the 
removal of Soviet offensive weapons from Cuba. Only hours later, however, a diplomatic 
cable to a Soviet KGB officer stationed in New York expressed a different offer and it 
was quietly relayed to the White House via back channels. In a diplomatic move later 
termed “Trollope’s Ploy,”115 Kennedy ignored the radio address and the previous cable, 
instead responding to the dispatch that offered the best way out of the crisis for the U.S. 
The end result was the Soviets’ acceptance of the terms laid out by Kennedy and their 
withdrawal of all warheads from Cuba, and an end to the crisis.116 
President Reagan is said to have been skilled at this as well. His rhetoric was 
filled with oxymora, arguing simultaneously for multiple inconsistent values that allowed 
for varied interpretation, and multiple policy options consistent with his proposed 
values.117  
On a more general level, it is often the case that ambiguous doctrine is developed 
around specific weapons or styles of war—for example, nuclear weapons—or around 
geographic areas. One intention of such ambiguous policy is doubtless to provide 
flexibility, allowing one to respond to unforeseen developments in the future (inherent or 
introduced factual ambiguities) without having to remake policy. However, another 
mechanism is also at work: In many cases, leaving the enemy uncertain about what we 
plan to do confers an advantage.  
This is obvious at the most basic tactical level. When performing an arrest, it is 
common to surprise the suspect. If he does not know what time you are likely to come for 
him, or which door you plan to enter from, he is left with far fewer options than if he has 
full knowledge of what you plan to do and when.  
                                                 
115. So named after a novel by Anthony Trollope in which a young woman purposefully misconstrues 
words and gestures to her liking. Ibid. 
116. Ibid.  
117. Michael Weiler and W. Barnett Pearce, eds., Reagan and Public Discourse in America, Studies in 
Rhetoric and Communication (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1992), 128–132. 
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But as one moves further from the tactical to the strategic realm, unpredictability 
often becomes much more difficult to maintain and the costs of developing such 
strategies can increase exponentially. For example, a decision to deploy submarine-based 
nuclear warheads specifically as a replacement for the MX missile fleet will necessitate 
the labors of tens of thousands of individuals, billions of dollars in investment, and 
massive movement of materiel that can be monitored by foreign intelligence agencies. To 
develop multiple such platforms is a nation-bankrupting expense, as the USSR eventually 
learned. To do so purely as a ruse would seem senseless. That said, the Strategic Defense 
Initiative (SDI) cost the U.S. billions of dollars and virtually everyone involved knew—
or at least strongly suspected—that it would never work.118 Some White House aides 
from that time period claim that the SDI was pursued in large part to force research by 
the Soviets that would divert spending away from more practical undertakings.119 
In seeking to apply the lessons of introduced uncertainty of intent to improve 
counterterrorism, it may be valuable to look at the conditions that made it valuable when 
facing the Soviets. On a grand strategic level our lack of clarity around when we would 
and would not respond to violations of containment was classic Schelling-style 
deterrence, coercion through threat of violence using ambiguity to solve the boundary 
problem. When dealing with a terrorist group that we believe will respond to deterrence, 
and for whom we have viable targets, a similar application might be possible. 
Given, however, that deterrence is often not an option when facing terrorists, what 
other ways might we be able to introduce this type of uncertainty? Generally, anytime we 
are likely to be attacked for specific actions we want to take, it would behoove us to 
muddy the waters on what we intend to do. In a previous section we discussed torture as 
one example of a policy ambiguity. During the war in Iraq, many also argued that any 
specific announced date for withdrawal from Iraq would only embolden terrorists, who 
would then be encouraged to wait and regroup until U.S. troops pulled out. Uncertainty 
about the intended completion date of the mission was judged to be an advantage. 
                                                 
118. Stephen F. Knott, At Reagan’s Side: Insiders’ Recollections from Sacramento to the White House 
(Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), 106. 
119. Ibid. 
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Any instances in which policy makers want to take a certain action but are loath 
to do so because of political blowback from allies or enemies might also be a good 
opportunity to introduce uncertainty. Before such an operation takes place, even a delay 
of public information about intended objectives may prove beneficial. Afterward, if there 
is a way to make unclear what the objectives were, doing so might protect our reputation 
if uncertainty about goals would be less offensive than the truth. 
Finally, taking lessons directly from Reagan, we might say that conflicting values 
confuse the issue of when we will and will not pursue individuals that behave as terrorists 
but are not universally classified as such. By proclaiming generic support for liberty and 
self-actualization while at the same time espousing support for peace and the rule of law, 
it is possible to provide oneself an array of possible actions to take, all of which are 
consistent with proclaimed values. 
The section above on introduced factual uncertainties mentioned that, in many 
cases, introduced factual uncertainties that apply to all sides of the conflict can be thought 
of as manufactured versions of inherent system ambiguities. This begs the question: What 
are examples of inherent ambiguities of intent—not introduced by us—that we might 
leverage to our advantage? These types of uncertainty are termed inherent uncertainties 
of intent and discussed next. 
D. INHERENT UNCERTAINTIES OF INTENT: TOUGH DECISIONS, SNAP 
JUDGMENTS AND MADMAN DIPLOMACY  
Because they exist in conceptual space—that is, in someone’s thoughts—inherent 
uncertainties of intent are more abstract and more difficult to analyze. The principles of 
bounded rationality provide an excellent tool to consider them, however, as one’s intent 
is based on one’s ability to 1) appropriately bound and understand the situation as it 
exists; 2) develop and predict outcomes of alternative actions; and 3) weigh the set of 
predicted outcomes of those alternatives against one another to determine which course 
of action is likely to yield the most favorable results given the context. In simpler terms, 
this might be described as understanding context and understanding how decisions one 
makes will interact with that context. In Snowden’s framework from Chapter 3, a 
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situation that allows for good understanding of all of these means one is dealing with 
“known knows,” which he would later describe as the “simple” realm of understanding in 
his Cynefin Framework. Unfortunately much of the world in which we operate is far 
from simple, in the normal use of the word or according to Snowden’s model. 
In a similar line of thinking, Nobel Prize winner Herbert Simon described the 
process of rational decision-making as being rooted in the interaction between the 
external environment (context) and internal environment (our ability to process the 
information).120 The complexity of the world we live in necessitates that we work with an 
incomplete set of data in practically all decision-making. It is simply too difficult to 
understand all the interactions and secondary effects of most actions we might take. We 
are therefore often unable to conceive of many possible actions and their outcomes, 
because our internal limitations are overwhelmed by external complexity. Our ability to 
make reasoned decisions in a timely manner is thus often severely limited, and highly 
changeable as new information shifts our perceptions. 
The distinction between internal and external environments can be used to outline 
two different sources of inherent uncertainty of intent, analogues of Snowden’s 
known/unknown matrix.121 The first is rooted in the external environment, and trickles 
down from the inherent ambiguities of fact. As one example: if one hopes to attack an 
enemy this evening, but is unsure of whether the storm this afternoon will wash out roads 
badly enough to hamper travel, one’s intent is likely to remain uncertain until better 
information comes available. In a rapidly evolving situation—the norm for tactical 
commanders in battle—decisions must be made quickly. Until that happens, oneself and 
one’s enemy remain uncertain of what intent might be. This can be classified as an 
inherent uncertainty of intent, applicable to both sides of the conflict. 
The second source of inherent uncertainty springs from the cognitive limitations 
of the decision-makers. These certainly contribute to the systemic uncertainties described 
                                                 
120. Herbert A. Simon, The Sciences of the Artificial, 3rd ed (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996), 25. 
121. This is somewhat of a rough comparison, as Snowden’s assessment is less rooted in our 
perception of the system (as Cynefin attempts to model complexity) than qualities of the system itself, 
whereas Simon is focusing more on modeling our understanding. Nevertheless, the comparison is useful 
and there is much overlap. 
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in the preceding paragraph, but in extreme circumstances an individual’s inability to 
make rational decisions can overwhelm even “good enough” data about non-complex 
situations. In these cases behavior becomes unpredictable from the perspective of anyone 
considering the situation from a more reasoned perspective. A leader who is truly 
insane—or truly daft—is likely, through not having a good grip on the relationship 
between decisions and their consequences, to behave in extremely unpredictable ways.  
History offers countless examples of rulers that had at least a touch of insanity. 
Ivan the Terrible’s “complex personality” was an advantage in that he was one minute a 
gifted diplomat and the next acting on paranoid delusions, feeding to his dogs anyone 
who displayed even a hint of disloyalty.122 Such random brutality is an advantage when 
building an empire by force, why may help explain why so many dictatorial rulers 
throughout history appear to have been mentally unstable. In modern times, we like to 
believe that leaders are rationally selected and make decisions through rational processes. 
However, because instability and unpredictability can be an advantage, there are still 
leaders who appear to be a little insane (a contemporary example might be the leadership 
of North Korea) and many others act that way at times.  
Democratic regimes are not immune from this type of leadership. President 
Richard Nixon in particular was famous for what became known as “madman 
diplomacy.” His National Security Advisor and later Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
worked hard to cultivate an image of Nixon as emotionally unstable and unpredictable.123 
In one case, they went so far as to launch eighteen B-52 bombers armed with 
thermonuclear warheads over the North Pole to threaten an end to the Vietnam war “at all 
costs.”124 While we now know that most of the more unpredictable actions were a 
calculated act—that is, they were introduced uncertainties of intent—the success of these 
tactics illustrates the utility that similar, non-manufactured inherent uncertainties can also 
offer in the modern age. 
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Many other possible examples might be cited of the trumpeting of national pride 
to the point that it is unclear just how far one is willing to go. As with madman-
diplomacy strategies, such an approach is setting the stage for unpredictability. In a way 
it limits one’s options by putting them in the hands of unpredictable chance events, in this 
case the craving of the public for war. A leader can, through antagonistic rhetoric, incite 
citizens to desire war. This can create a situation in which intent is limited, and shifted 
day-by-day according to the winds of national politics. Are such actions examples of 
introduced or inherent ambiguities of intent? If correctly crafted, almost no one knows for 
sure whether they are inherent and irresistible or wholly manufactured, and it does not 
make much difference one way or the other. As long as they are credible, advantage can 
be gained either way. 
E. PRINCIPLES OF UNCERTAINTY MANAGEMENT 
In ancient Greece, political or military power was understood to take different 
forms. In its most rudimentary and predictable incarnation, applying the brute force of 
overwhelming strength to get one’s way was known as bie. This stood opposed to metis, 
the power of trickery and cunning.125 Many of the great epics have this dichotomy at 
their center, epitomized by Achilles and Odysseus at the gates of Troy. Some scholars 
have gone so far as to say that “to speak Homerically is to speak of a contrast of bie and 
metis.”126 This dichotomy is by no means limited to the Greeks. Nearly every historical 
mythological tradition sets a trickster-type figure against a powerful heroic figure, a trend 
that has led to the understanding of these figures as the most basic of Jungian 
archetypes.127 “The hero and the trickster are the most durable of storytelling figures, 
ancient, unchanging, adapting to contemporary realities but never the same.”128 There is 
something fundamental in ourselves that we see in both. The trickster represents our 
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“shameful origins” and a manifestation of our weaknesses as humans. The hero, on the 
other hand, is our “glorious vision” of ourselves as powerful and in control.129  
In different times and different cultures, one side or the other is often ascendant. 
In ancient Greece, an irregular and ever-evolving collection of small city-states 
surrounded by much larger and more powerful enemies, metis was judged by culture and 
confirmed by myth to be superior. We see this in the ultimate triumph of Odysseus as he 
faced down a series of mighty adversaries through a variety of clever methods, including 
binding himself to the mast to avoid the sirens and resigning the field of battle at Troy 
only to infiltrate the city in a wooden horse.130 
Ancient Rome serves as a stark contrast. The most powerful nation of their time, 
they favored bie and had a more positive view of war generally. This is illustrated 
perhaps most dramatically by the role that the god of war through strength, Mars, played 
in their culture. In Greece, Ares—roughly equivalent to Rome’s Mars—was referred to as 
despicable and considered secondary to the crafty goddess Athena. Mars, in contrast, held 
an “esteemed central position” in Roman society.131 
The U.S. has its own share of myths, but benefits from a context that informs 
Americans’ valuation of these classical archetypes. Largely insulated from any powerful 
enemies geographically since the nation’s founding, U.S. citizens have recently enjoyed 
more than two generations of worldwide hegemony.132 Our military capabilities are 
designed to defeat two major powers simultaneously in different parts of the world. For 
some of the last fifty years we had one powerful enemy, though never two; our military 
superiority has been clearly dominant for most of the time since World War II and 
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unquestionable for the last sixty years.133 In addition, many other nations around the 
world have looked to the U.S. to settle disputes or maintain peace when they were unable 
to do so. As a result, the U.S. has become accustomed to relying on bie as its go-to 
method of wielding power. This tendency has been reinforced by Americans’ justified 
devotion to transparency and predictability in governance, and by a calcified 
understanding of America’s place of unquestioned power.134 
Although the U.S. still possesses more military might than the rest of the world 
combined, its overreliance on bie as the de facto solution to security problems illustrates 
a failure to adapt to the evolving nature of warfare. Terrorist-type attacks have proven 
difficult to predict, prevent or deter. The asymmetric nature of terrorism, evolved to deal 
with the overwhelming dominance of American forces in traditional warfare, is 
incredibly difficult to defeat using only overwhelming capabilities—be they intelligence, 
economic or direct military action. Perhaps part of the solution can be found in the tools 
of ambiguity. Recognition of the limitations of clear and obvious dominance, and 
harnessing the power of metis by embracing existing uncertainties and manufacturing 
new ones, may offer advantages that are not currently recognized.135 
Any cohesive strategy that employs ambiguity to counter security threats must 
first attempt to outline the types of circumstances in which this type of tool may be 
useful. To start we must consider what is necessary for an enemy to pose a threat. At its 
most basic, people attack when they have: 1) a desire to do harm, 2) the capabilities to do 
so successfully, and 3) a belief that the benefits of attacking, with their given capabilities 
and our given defenses, are likely to be greater than the costs. Without all three 
conditions, an attack is unlikely to occur, so removing any of these three criteria is 
usually sufficient to provide protection. 
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Convincing enemies they have no desire to attack is ideal in that it solves the 
problem at its root, but as that approach often fails other alternatives must be considered. 
Countering an enemy’s ability to attack might be accomplished directly by destroying his 
offensive capabilities, or by increasing one’s own defensive capabilities beyond what the 
enemy is able to overcome. One might also diminish the enemy’s capabilities indirectly 
through economic sanctions or eliminating sources of support, either of which can be 
accomplished through any of the above methods. Finally, persuading an enemy that the 
costs of an attack are not worth the benefits comes down to the classic concept of 
deterrence,136 and can be accomplished by a combination of defensive measures and/or 
threats of retaliation, thus changing either or both sides of the equation. Figure 2 
illustrates the variety of options that are available.137 
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Figure 2.  The escalation ladder of deterrence 
In considering historical nation-states, all of these methods have proved effective 
at one time or another. Over time a country tries to minimize enmity through treaties, 
diplomacy, and economic integration, all usually forms of co-option. Having capable 
defenses ensures that an enemy would not be able to successfully attack without a 
significant outlay of resources, as overcoming defensive fortifications would require 
massive capabilities. This changes the calculus and renders the attack no longer worth the 
sum of 1) the outlay of resources required to attack; and 2) the cost of the expected 
response. Finally, through economic sanctions and targeted smaller attacks, countries 
work to minimize the capabilities of their known enemies.  
The modern age shifted this formula somewhat. It became far easier for a nuclear 
power to unleash massive destructive capabilities without putting much at risk in the way 
of their own resources, and defensive fortifications became less important as there was 
virtually no way to protect a city from nuclear missile attack. The rise of modern nation-
states also made unacceptable even small attacks that people in previous eras could have 
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written off,138 and technological advances made it easier for lone actors to achieve more 
spectacular attacks. Taken together this makes it much more difficult, if not impossible, 
for an open society to prevent unacceptable levels of casualties simply by spending more 
on defensive measures, even for non-nuclear attacks.139 Deterrence thus became the order 
of the day, and remains a key part of our approach to security to this day.140  
When facing nation-state enemies, deterrence is relatively simple because good 
deterrence targets are numerous and obvious, and often important to no one but the 
enemy. A powerful nation therefore has little problem with the capability to attack, 
understanding what is important to the enemy, or maintaining the will to do so. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, however, with terrorists this is often impossible because terrorist 
organizations tend to present fewer targets, and few at all that can be hit without 
damaging the interests of those we rely on for support. For a modern superpower trying 
to maintain the moral high ground and prevent future attacks as well as immediate ones, 
true deterrent strikes are simply not an option much of the time.141  
This limits the menu of possible of options in preventing terrorism to removing 
the motivation to attack us; deterring through other means than threats of destruction of 
critical targets; or by decreasing their capabilities, either through direct attacks or by 
removing vectors of support. As would be expected of any nation with a culture that 
favors a bie approach to power, the U.S. appears to have focused its energy on building 
better defensive systems, and rooting out terrorists using superior intelligence capabilities 
then destroying them using superior military technology. But when dealing with an 
enemy that does not rely on strength or defensive fortifications, and holds dear only 
things that are also important to our allies, we are left with few options. In such a 
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situation it may behoove us to employ more metis ourselves and, like Odysseus, resort to 
trickery when necessary, binding ourselves to the mast when the situation warrants or 
resigning the field to gain a different type of advantage. 
F. SUMMARY OF AMBIGUITY AND UNCERTAINTY IN COUNTER-
TERRORISM 
This chapter has looked at four classes of uncertainty, based on the previous 
section’s distinction between inherent and introduced uncertainty, and uncertainty of 
intent versus uncertainty of fact. At times distinctions were also made between 
uncertainties that we introduce only to the enemy, which overlap largely with 
disinformation. At other times, we considered uncertainties that degrade our own 








V. ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 
The previous chapters outlined the weakness of terrorism studies as opposed to 
nuclear deterrence theory, described in some detail the defining characteristics of 
ambiguity and uncertainty, and presented some examples of how uncertainty might be 
leveraged as an advantage in counterterrorism policy.  
But as with many areas of public policy, simply because an approach helps meet 
an objective does not mean that its application is necessarily a positive development. In 
security policy particularly, the strategic objective of a nation safe from attacks must be 
balanced against the many other goals that make the nation worth protecting. 
The leveraging or introduction of uncertainty in counterterrorism policy presents 
three immediate risks that must be recognized: legal constraints, ethical concerns, and 
cultural effects. Each of these is discussed briefly in the following pages. 
A. LEGALITY AND AN OPEN SOCIETY 
As World War II came to a close in 1945, philosopher Karl Popper published The 
Open Society and Its Enemies,142 which would come to define how modern Western 
nation-states saw themselves. Popper’s influential political treatise represented a battle of 
political ideals that would parallel the nuclear conflict described in chapter two for the 
same fifty-year period. It is telling that the book begins with a quote by Pericles: 
“Although only a few may originate a policy, we are all able to judge it.”143 Although 
“transparency” was not yet a term in vogue, the idea behind Popper’s entire two-volume 
work was that a government with transparent policies, open to analysis and changeable if 
necessary by the population at large, was the only path away from totalitarianism. The 
second volume focused on the shortcomings of Marxism in particular and social 
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engineering in general because, Popper argued, societal evolution is too complex and 
unpredictable to be engineered.144 
Although the ideals of an open society in its modern incarnation were formalized 
by Popper, the idea of open government is a foundational aspect of democracies 
throughout history. “One of the most notable achievements of Athenian democracy in 
ancient times was its establishment of civilian oversight of public funds and the wealth 
and incomes of all public figures (including generals), so that they did not benefit from 
their public positions.”145 Transparent policies and comprehensible procedures for their 
development have been characteristic of successful democratic societies ever since, 
which is necessary both for stable governance146 and healthy economic growth.147 This 
was recognized for the U.S. by its founding fathers, who designed a government full of 
checks and balances to ensure deliberate rule-making, and subsidized newspaper 
distribution to ensure an informed populace.148 “However firmly liberty may be 
established in any country, it cannot long subsist if the channels of information be 
stopped,” wrote Elbridge Gerry, in arguing for newspaper subsidies in 1792.149 Efforts to 
maintain transparency have precipitated the creation of laws at every level of government 
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that ensure the public has access to information on policy and to the debates on why the 
policies are put in place.150 
The first challenge to any implementation of deliberately ambiguous security 
policies is the letter and spirit of these transparency laws. While some methods of 
introducing uncertainty doubtless pose no challenge to these laws, others may prove 
problematic. If one were to try to use techniques touched upon in the preceding chapters, 
a thorough analysis of legal requirements would be a necessity. 
B. ETHICS AND UNCERTAINTY 
Closely related to the problems of legality are the ethical questions likely to be 
raised if the U.S. were to start leveraging ambiguity or injecting uncertainty into security 
policies. This type of challenge is broader in scope, and more a more difficult question on 
which to rule definitively. 
As with most ethical dilemmas,151 the question of how much uncertainty might be 
leveraged without straying into unethical behavior is actually a conflict between two 
accepted moral imperatives.152 Specifically, those who craft security policy have a 
responsibility to maintain transparent governance, but also to maintain the greatest 
possible level of security for the American public.  
The use of ambiguous policies, even when legal, may at times still be judged 
unethical. Like other dilemmas faced by security practitioners the law is a good starting 
point in addressing this issue, but one must also weigh potential gains against past 
practices and public expectations of behavior. There are many ethical frameworks one 
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might employ to make such judgments, and most fall clearly into one of two categories: 
deontological (rule-based ethics) or consequential (judging actions by their 
consequences). Discussions of nuclear deterrence may again be helpful in this 
consideration, as much has been written on the ethics of deterrence. Summarized by 
Steven Lee, “The consequentialist argument shows nuclear deterrence to be morally 
required, whereas the deontological argument shows nuclear deterrence to be morally 
prohibited.”153 This is the case because deterrence, like purposefully ambiguous security 
policy, goes against how we expect government to ethically behave. However, a 
consequentialist argument would exonerate both types of policy (deterrence and 
ambiguity) on the grounds that the result of such policies should mean a safer world.154 
Specific routes out of the dilemma are myriad, but often rely on weighing the 
varying ethical prescriptions against one another. This approach is at least as old as Plato, 
who wrote in the Republic of whether one has the duty to return a friend’s weapon when 
he is out of his right mind.155 In this example, it is clear to most that the consequentialist 
argument (great harm may come from doing so) clearly outweighs the deontological 
argument (I should return my friend’s property when he asks). Multiple individuals, 
operating within different paradigms and according to different ethical systems, might be 
able to make such an evaluation more reliably than one person alone. This method would 
be in line with the arguments of John Rawls, one of the pre-eminent political and moral 
philosophers of the last century. In Political Liberalism, Rawls argues that legitimacy of 
government action can be maintained only if policies are consistent with an “overlapping 
consensus” of what a significant portion of the diverse public finds appropriate.156 
Though this sounds complicated, in many cases it may be as easy as considering, from 
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multiple perspectives, how likely the public would be to find a given policy acceptable 
should they understand both the policy and its context. 
Using this approach, a final determination of the ethics of deliberately ambiguous 
counterterrorism policy must therefore be considered on a case-by-case basis. Any 
particular application of the utility of ambiguity should be weighed, on its own merits, 
according to different ethical systems. Comparing the moral obligations from each 
against Rawls’s “overlapping consensus” should yield answers that, most of the time, are 
the correct moral positions for government to take. This is simple enough when 
considering tactical or narrowly scoped policies of ambiguity, but requires a much 
broader discussion when it is to be employed as doctrine. 
C. CULTURE AND UNCERTAINTY 
Culture resides at even more of a macro level than legality or ethics. As such its 
scope is incredibly broad, and the uncertainty around how to weigh cultural effects of 
policy is even greater than when discussing ethics. Even when a decision to propagate 
ambiguous policies is deemed both legal and ethical, one must consider how consistent it 
is with the cultural context, and what far-ranging effects it might have via the mechanism 
of culture. 
There are many definitions of culture. Esteemed cultural anthropologist Alfred 
Kroeber’s is one of the more thorough and relevant for this examination: 
Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior 
acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive 
achievements of human groups, including their embodiments in artifacts; 
the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e., historically derived 
and selected) ideas and especially their attached values; culture systems 
may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action, and on the 
other as conditioning elements of further action.157 [Emphasis added.] 
This definition recognizes both that culture creates expectations of how we should 
behave, and that culture is constantly remanufactured by the actions that we take. Each of 
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these aspects of culture poses a risk when one creates policy that is inconsistent with 
established cultural expectations. 
The section on legality above offered evidence of the esteemed place that 
transparency has in American democracy. Open government laws exist because of the 
widespread understanding that such openness is a fundamental and necessary quality of 
American government. Citizens expect that those making decisions about how to manage 
the nation’s affairs will be open and honest to the greatest degree possible. When this 
expectation is not met, trust in government erodes and it becomes more difficult to meet 
the full spectrum of responsibilities given to policy makers. Lower levels of trust lead to 
greater rates of lawbreaking, tax evasion, political apathy, and radicalization.158  
If unnecessary failures to govern transparently can erode trust, thus shifting 
culture through action, the feedback loop described by Kroeber says that a shift in culture 
away from trust and legitimacy can be expected to then spur further violations of trust. 
Some secondary violations of trust are bound to be less anodyne, less honorable, and 
more caustic. In its worse forms, this cycle creates a “security trap” whereby those in 
power use the authority of government to entrench their own interests. Bad behavior and 
self-interested decisions become fully incentivized, crime rises and corruption becomes 
rampant.159 This vicious cycle is one that must be avoided if at all possible. 
Luckily, while our culture values transparency it values security highly as well 
and this is reflected in the public discourse. The clash between these tenets has been on 
display recently in the public debate about Edward Snowden160 and the NSA handling of 
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phone records.161 Although there is much vehement disagreement, it appears that 
Americans seem to believe the system usually works well. Americans have higher levels 
of faith in their government doing the right thing “most of the time” than citizens of most 
other countries, including other wealthy democracies.162 The military and law 
enforcement in particular are held in high regard in the U.S., more trusted than the 
medical system or even churches.163 
As policy makers, we must therefore work to manage cultural expectations, 
expressing and demonstrating adherence to the American values of transparency 
whenever possible. This should, in theory, allow us the space to spread uncertainty when 
necessary to increase security. As a genuinely practical populace, Americans can be 
expected to be understanding of such a balance being struck as long as it is done 
thoughtfully and with regard to secondary impacts. 
D. CONCLUSION: BALANCING OF THE RISKS 
Legal, ethical and cultural concerns having been considered, the final valuation is 
that ambiguous security policies, when employed to counter security dangers such as 
terrorism, are likely to be acceptable. Before implementation, however, any such policy 
must be examined by numerous individuals with varied backgrounds in law and ethics to 
ensure they are worth the costs. Those costs may be as clear-cut as minor violations of 
law or as amorphous as secondary cultural impacts sometime in the future. Careful 
analysis is important, and might follow the example set by theorists who have written 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The previous chapters have presented a case that the United States, and other 
powerful Western-style democracies, can gain advantage from harnessing the power of 
ambiguity and uncertainty. This argument first outlined the weakness of terrorism studies 
as opposed to nuclear deterrence theory, then offered defining characteristics of 
ambiguity and uncertainty. Finally, examples of how uncertainty might be leveraged as 
an advantage in counter-terrorism policy were presented and examined in light of legal, 
ethical and cultural concerns. 
Developing general principles around such an amorphous topic is an ambitious 
task, but based on the research presented in this thesis the following appear to be true: 
1. Ambiguity is present in many ways in nearly every situation we find 
ourselves. Being aware of it, we may be able to leverage it to our 
advantage. 
2. In certain situations, introducing new or additional uncertainty or 
ambiguity can create a strategic security advantage. 
3. When it is clear that the enemy can be defeated openly and transparently, 
it behooves an open society to maintain openness and transparency 
because ambiguity carries with it a variety of risks. 
If these conclusions are true, another emerges from them: 
4. The larger the security risk that one is facing from an enemy, the more 
likely that the introduction of ambiguities will be worth the risk if it can be 
shown to provide advantages. 
This conclusion is also strengthened by other circumstantial evidence presented in 
this thesis. The time during which the U.S. faced its most critical security threats in 
modern history corresponded with the peak of interest in, study, and practical application 
of information and game theory as applied to security policies. 
Further research appears to be warranted to determine the efficacy of the 
application of ambiguity in the manner presented here, and whether this thesis’ final 
conclusion is valid. Measuring the threat posed by an enemy would appear to be a 
challenge, but some scholars have developed metrics that may be helpful. For more 
classical projections of military power, offensive realist John Mearsheimer discusses how 
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one might measure power,164 which one must then combine with some measure of intent. 
As discussed in the above chapters, however, traditional measures of power and threat do 
not often translate well to non-state terrorist organizations. For this reason it may be 
worth considering other approaches, such as the “3-S Model” presented in Special 
Warfare by Major Douglas Mills.165 By estimating not only the scale and scope of a 
terrorist group’s capabilities, but also its reach and motivations, such a perspective would 
likely provide much more accurate valuations of when a strategy of ambiguity may be 
helpful. If the arguments of this thesis are correct, terrorist groups that score highly on 
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